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INTRODUCTION
What do patents,' patients, and public policy have in common?
Public policy goals are the foundation for both the patent and the
health care systems. A fundamental policy of the patent system is
to foster innovation. The patent laws encourage innovation by
giving patent holders3 the right to exclude all others from using a
patented invention during the term of the patent.4 At odds with
this right to exclude is a fundamental policy of the medical system
to provide patients with access to medical treatment.5
' A patent is a type of intellectual property that functions similarly to a deed or title
for other types of property. See, e.g., Kearns v. General Motors Corp., 94 F.3d 1553, 1555
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (quoting Consolidated Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1876))
(noting that "a patent for an invention is as much property as a patent for land*). Like
those items, the patent confers legal rights regarding an object that is physically separate.
In the case of a patent, the right conferred to the patent owner is the right to exclude all
others from making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing the patented invention
in the United States for a limited period of time in exchange for full disclosure to the
public of the invention such that the invention will be available for public use once the
term expires. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994); id. § 261 (1994), id. § 271 (1994 & Supp. IV
1998).
' Although there are various theories forjustifying the patent system, fostering of
innovation is often cited as fundamental. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats,
Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) (noting that Constitution and Patent Act are intended to
encourage innovation); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974)
(noting that patent laws are intended to provide incentives to invent); Paulik v. Rizkalla,
760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (noting that purpose of patent system is "to encour-
age innovation and its fruits"); see also Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co.,
62 F.3d 1512, 1536 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Newman, J., concurring) ("The patent law is di-
rected to the public purposes of fostering technological progress, investment in research
and development, capital formation, entrepreneurship, innovation, national strength,
and international competitiveness.*), affd sub nor. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis
Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40-41 (1997). See genera/y Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the
Progress of Scienc Ex.lusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1024-46
(1989) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science] (discussing various theo-
ries for justifying patent system).
' Technically, a patentee is the inventor of the patent, but not necessarily the owner
if the patentee has assigned her rights in the patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 152 (1994) (noting
that patent may be issued to assignee of inventor); id. § 261 (noting that patents have
"attributes of personal property" and are therefore assignable). However, this Article uses
the term "patentee" interchangeably with the terms "patent owner" and "patent holder."
' See, e.g., id. § 271. However, the right to exclude others only exists for the limited
duration of the patent term, which generally ends 20 years after the patent application is
filed. See id. § 154 (1994 & Supp. WV 1998).
3 See, e.g., AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS: CURRENT
OPINIONS xii (1992) (noting that patients have rights to adequate health care and that
physicians should work toward fulfilling that goal regardless of patient's inability to pay
for care). Although no health care law expressly states this policy, access to health care is
a core principle of medical ethics. See i&
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The underlying policies of these two systems - one that pro-
motes limited access and another that promotes increased access
- conflict where the systems intersect: medical procedure patents.
Nonetheless, the tension between the two systems has been long
dormant, in part because patent holders traditionally have not en-
forced their rights against doctors.6 Recently, however, the conflict
became readily apparent in a patent infringement suit7 concerning
a patented medical procedure. In 1994, Dr. Samuel Pallin sued
another doctor for using his patented method of performing cata-
ract surgery.8 This case drew national attention because it was be-
lieved to be the first instance in which a doctor sued another doc-
tor9 for patent infringement. 0 Moreover, the case demonstrated
' See, e.g., Sabra Chartrand, Why Is This Surgeon Suing, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1995, at
D2; Robert L. Lowes, Are You Stealingfrom Other Doctors?, MED. ECON., Mar. 11, 1996, at
195, 206-07.
' A patent infringement action is a civil action that may be initiated by the patent
owner against someone that is using patented technology without authority in contraven-
tion of the patent owner's right to exclude all others during the term of a patent. See 35
U.S.C. § 271 (providing that one who "without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells
any patented invention within the United States, or imports into the United States any
patented invention during the term of the patent thereof, infringes the patent."); id. §
281 (1994) (providing that patent owner "shall have remedy by civil action for infringe-
ment of his patent").
8 SeeChartrand, supranote 6, atD2; see also U.S. Patent No. 5,080,111 (Jan. 14, 1992)
("Method of Making Self-Sealing Episcleral Incision"). It should also be noted that the
circumstances that led to Pallin's actual infringement suit may be unique. Pallin sought a
patent after he failed to obtain the usual sign of professional recognition in the form of
publication of his invention in a peer-reviewed journal. See, e.g., Legislation. PTO Assails
Bills to Limit Patents on Medical Procedures, 50 BNA'S PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHTJ. 731,
737 (1995); Lowes, supra note 6, at 206; see alsoJeffrey I.D. Lewis, Medical Patents: How Far
Can They Go?, HEALTH SYSTEMS REv., Sept.-Oct. 1995, at 22, 23 (noting that journal re-
jected his article as being of "very little importance"); Ron Stodghill, First, Do No Harm.
Then, Get a Patent, Bus. WK., July 24, 1995, at 86 (noting that Pallin received terse rejec-
tion letter that noted his research was of "little importance"). Although the journal that
initially rebuffed him did eventually publish an article by Pallin on this surgical method,
Pallin still believed that he had been denied his due recognition because his publication
was merely one in a slew of articles concerning the same issue and he could not duly
claim to be the inventor. See Lowes, supra note 6, at 206; Samuel L. Pallin, Chevron Suture-
less Closure: A Preliminar Report, 17 J. CATARACT & REFRACT. SURG. 706 (Supp. 1991).
Moreover, the incentive to sue Singer in particular, may have arisen because Singer pub-
lished an article discussing the invention Pallin believed that he invented, without citing
Pallin. SeeJack A. Singer, Review of Incision and Closure Techniques for Cataract Surge, 10
OPHTHALMIC PRAC. 152 (1992). Pallin is said to believe that Singer was taking credit for
his idea; litigation ensued after Singer refused to pay royalties on Pallin's patent. See
Chartrand, supra note 6, at D2 (quoting Pallin as stating, "Dr. Singer has largely taken
credit for my idea and I resent it.").
9 Less notable was that the hospital where the doctor worked was also charged as a
defendant. See Pallin v. Singer, No. 2:93-CV-202, 1996 WL 274407, at *1 (D. Vt. Mar. 28,
604
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that a doctor could be personally liable for patent infringement by
performing a routine medical procedure without actual knowledge
of a patent."
Although the defendants in that suit ultimately prevailed by es-
tablishing that the patent was invalid,12 many doctors remained
concerned about the implications of medical procedure patents."
1996); see also Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 701 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(involving infringement suit against hospital rather than doctor).See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 8, at 24; Brian McCormick, just Reward or Just Plain
Wrong?, AM. MED. NEWS, Sept. 5, 1994, at 3, 32. However, more than a century ago, den-
tists apparently found themselves in a similar position to doctors today when they were
pressured for royalties by a colleague with a patent on a dental device. See, e.g., William S.
Deeley, Dentisty in the US: Struggle, Disputes, Lawsuits, DENTAL STUDENT, Mar. 1978, at 67,
74; Malvin E. Ring, The Rubber Denture Murder Case: The True Stoy of the Vulcanite Litigations,
32 BULL HIST. DENTISTRY 3, 5-17 (1984); see also William D. Noonan, PatentingMedical and
Surgical Procedures, 77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 651, 652-53 (1995) (describing
Vulcanite denture litigations of 1860s and 1870s as one of earliest American controversies
concerning patented medical procedures).
" See generally 35 U.S.C. § 271 (a) (containing no intent requirement for direct patent
infringement).
" See Pallin, 1996 WL 274407, at *1 (prohibiting Pallin from enforcing patent claims
against "the parties, any physician, health care provider, hospital, clinic, teaching institu-
tion, or other entity or person of any kind"); Carolyn Lederman, Pallin Patent Is Invali-
dated, OPHTHALMOLOGYTIMES, June 1, 1996, at 10.
Although patents are presumed valid, medical procedure patents, as well as other
patents, may have been improperly issued. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)
(providing that patent is "presumed valid" and providing that defendant can establish
invalidity of patent as complete defense to infringement action); Brooktree Corp. v. Ad-
vanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (noting that presump-
tion of validity is one of administrative correctness). A patent may be invalid if it fails to
comply with the technical requirements of patentability. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (noting that
invalidity may be based on failure to comply with any condition for patentability required
by §§ 101-104, 112, or 251 of Patent Act).
Though not reported in Pallin, the court agreed with Singer that Pallin had not
been the first to invent what he patented because other doctors, including Singer himself,
had preceded Pallin. See, e.g., Sally Squires, AMA Condemns Patents for Medical Pocedures,
WASH. POST, June 20, 1995, at Al (noting that Singer claims that he actually developed
and published Pallin's patented procedure before Pallin did so). Because Pallin's "inven-
tion" was not new, his patent was invalid for failing to meet the statutory requirement of
novelty. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994); see also infra notes 32-36 and accompanying text
(describing requirements for patentability).
" Although the American Medical Association ("AMA") noted that the new and
nonobvious requirements for patentability should theoretically prevent "improper" pat-
ents from being issued, the AMA believed that the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO")
was not abiding by these requirements, or at least was applying them too loosely. See
AMEIuCAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, ETHICAL
ISSUES IN THE PATENTING OF MEDICAL PROCEDURES 59, 67-68 (Report A-95 1995) [herein-
after AMA REPORT]. Moreover, some argued that even if the PTO attempted to adhere
more strictly to the statutory requirements, it would not be able to do so either because
the PTO does not have access to relevant prior art, or because examiners are incompetent
to examine the relevant art. See id.; Lowes, supra note 6, at 197-98. But see Hearings on
H.R. 1127 and H.R. 2419 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House
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Some doctors were troubled by the potential for personal liability
because they perceived that medical procedure patents were be-
coming commonplace 4 and that there was no easy method to de-
termine whether a procedure was patented. 5 They argued that the
threat of patent liability might compromise medical treatment and
result in a disincentive to share new technology. 6 These concerns
prompted doctors to lobby Congress for immunity from potential
liability for patent infringement.
In response to the strong medical lobby,'8 Congress amended the
Patent Act as part of the 1996 appropriations bill, adding section
287(c) to the Patent Act.' Congress passed the new law over objec-
Comm. on theJudiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) [hereinafter CongressionalHearings on
H.R 1127 and H.R. 2419] (dismissing proposition by ABA representative Don Dunner).
The Pallin litigation, however, reinforced the perception that the PTO could not distin-
guish new inventions. See AMA REPORT, supra, at 68.
" Doctors were concerned by what appeared to be an increasing number of medical
procedure patents, as well as the perception that more commonplace technology was
being patented - both of which would increase the probability of personal liability. Se,
e.g., AMA REPORT, supra note 13, at 60; Lewis, supra note 8, at 24. However, there was no
firm evidence of an increasing number of such patents. See, e.g., Lowes, supra note 6, at
195-96 (alleging that "today, the Patent Office is awarding about 100 pure procedure
patents each month - roughly double the number in 1985," but not providing any sup-
port for these empirical figures); McCormick, supra note 10, at 3 (stating that "what began
as a trickle less than 20 years ago is becoming a flood, with one [unnamed] lawyer esti-
mating that as many as 15 medical procedures are patented every week").
" Se, e.g., AMA REPORT, supra note 13, at 62; see also infra notes 141-42 and accom-
panying text (explaining that doctors may use older procedures because they cannot
easily determine what is patented).
" See AMA REPORT, supra note 13, at 62-65; see also infra notes 103-06, 134-42 and
accompanying text (discussing sharing norm among doctors and need for access to new
technologies).
" In 1994, while the Pallin lawsuit was still pending, the AMA adopted a resolution
"vigorously condemning" patents directed to "medical and surgical practices." AMA,
House of Delegates Annual Meeting, Substitute Resolution No. 2 (1994). Furthermore,
the resolution asserted that the AMA should "work with Congress to outlaw" the patenting
of medical procedures. See id. Similarly, in July, 1995, the AMA Council on Ethical and
Judicial Affairs issued an opinion in which it concluded that the patenting of medical
procedures was ethically improper. See AMA REPORT, supra note 13, at 68.
" See, eg., GeraldJ. Mossinghoff, Remedies Under Patents on Medical and Surgical Proc-
dures, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 789, 790 (1996) (noting that broad coalition of
medical groups was formed, including American Society of Cataract and Refractive Sur-
gery and other surgical and specialty associations).
" See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (Supp. 11 1996). Congress passed this amendment after
debating and rejecting several bills that specifically dealt with medical procedures. See
H.R. 3814, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996); S. 1334, 104th Cong. § 2 (1995); H.R. 1127,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); Congressional Hearings on H.R. 1127 and H.R. 2419, supra
note 13; Public Hearing on Patent Protection for Therapeutic and Diagnostic Methods,
May 2, 1996, <http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/notices/diaghear.txt> (on file
with author) [hereinafter Public Hearing]. This Article will not reiterate the complete
process of legislative proposals as these have already been extensively discussed in other
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tions concerning the substance of the amendment as well as the
inadequacy of congressional consideration." Section 287(c) pre-
vents patent owners from suing doctors for infringing medical pro-
cedure patents such as Pallin's.2 1 This section effectively grants a
royalty-free, compulsory license 5 to the most likely users of pat-
ented medical procedures - doctors.
Although the medical lobby was successful in prompting Con-
gress to enact the immunity provision, the medical lobby failed to
immunize physicians completely from patent liability.5 In particu-
lar, although the amendment provides immunity to doctors per-
forming a "medical activity," the definition of the critical term
"medical activity" is vague and riddled with exceptions that make
articles. See, e.g., Richard P. Burgoon, Silk Purses, Sows Ears and Other Nuances Regarding 35
U.S.C. 287(c), 4 U. BALT. INTELL- PROP. L.J. 69 (1996);Joseph M. Reisman, Physicians and
Surgeons as Inventors: Reconciling Medical Process Patents and Medical Ethics, 10 HIGH TECH.
LJ. 355 (1995).
2 For example, Orrin Hatch noted:
I express my opposition to the medical patents provision which was in-
cluded in this bill. This measure was added notwithstanding the fact that
there were no Senate hearings, and over the objections of myself, the
chairman of the Finance Committee and the United States Trade Repre-
sentative. It is an unprecedented change to our patent code ....
142 CONG. REC. S11,843 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch). In addi-
tion, the objection echoed similar criticism of an amendment to a prior appropriations
bill which failed to pass. See id. at H8277 (daily ed. July 24, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Moorhead) (noting that amendment is "attempt to strip the Judiciary Committee of its
jurisdiction" over subject matter and for that reason alone should be rejected); id. at
H8279 (daily ed. July 24, 1996) (statement of Rep. Schroeder) ("Wqe have no business
legislating radical changes in U.S. patent law on an appropriations bll.... We are not
only bypassing the Judiciary Committee with this amendment, but we are also engaging in
a very hasty process that does not bode well for developing good policy."); id. (statement
of Rep. Eshoo) (noting that "this is a complicated issue that deserves greater considera-
tion than 10 minutes of debate on an appropriations bill"); id. at H8278 (statement of
Rep. Mollohan) (noting that appropriations bill is not appropriate forum for amending
patent laws).
See35 U.S.C. § 287(c).
Some governments, including the United States, grant individuals or government
entities permission to use a patented invention without consent of the patent holder.
Although patent owners often license their patents, this situation is unique in that the
patent owner is forced to accept the license. Accordingly, it is referred to as a "compul-
sory license."
" See infra notes 183-201 and accompanying text. Doctors, however, may believe that
they are now free of liability for use of patented processes in the routine course of prac-
tice. See, e.g., Mark S. Hughes, Medical Patent Bill Gives Doctors New Protections,
OPHTHALMOLOGY TIMES,Jan. 15, 1997, at 28 (noting that section 287(c) *frees physicians
from procedure patent lawsuits").
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the immunity very narrow .2 The amendment, thus, fails to achieve
the fundamental goal of eliminating the specter of patent in-
fringement suits against doctors."
At the same time, section 287(c) departs from the fundamental
patent policy of promoting innovation by granting exclusive rights.
Because the control associated with the right to exclude is critical
to fostering innovation, compulsory licensing of patents is typically
disfavored.2 Section 287(c) departs from this tradition by effec-
tively requiring holders of medical procedure patents to license
their inventions at no cost. By so doing, the amendment threatens
to undermine the incentive to create innovative new medical pro-
cedures.
Section 287(c) is also problematic because it establishes a prece-
dent for creating exceptions to patent enforcement based upon a
person's status. This could result in additional exceptions in re-
sponse to lobbying by special interest groups. Accordingly, section
287(c) threatens the patent system's ability to promote innovation
in all areas.
Moreover, because Congress passed the new law with only cur-
sory consideration of international obligations, the United States
now stands at risk of violating the international trade and intellec-
tual property agreements that it has aggressively advocated. Sec-
tion 287(c) potentially conflicts with the United States's interna-
tional obligations under the World Trade Organization Agree-
ment7 and the related Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property ("TRIPS").28
The new amendment defines "medical activity" as:
[T]he performance of a medical or surgical procedure on a body, but shall
not include (i) the use of a patented machine, manufacture, or composition
of matter in violation of such patent, (ii) the practice of a patented use of
a composition of matter in violation of such patent, or (iii) the practice of
a process in violation of a biotechnology patent.
35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2) (A) (emphasis added); see also infra notes 165-92 and accompanying
text (explaining exceptions and limitations of § 287(c)).
See infra notes 194-201 and accompanying text.
s See infra notes 202-14 and accompanying text (discussing traditional policy of pro-
tecting right to exclude inherent in patent protection by limiting compulsory licensing).
" See World Trade Organization, About the WTO (visited Jan. 20, 2000)
<htt://www.wto.org/about/about.htm> (on file with author).
See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol.
1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994); Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
608 [Vol. 33:601
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This Article argues that section 287(c) should be repealed be-
cause it not only failed to achieve its intended purpose, but has also
endangered domestic and international policies. Although there
has been some discussion of medical procedure patents from a
domestic perspective, commentators have not analyzed the inter-
national impact of section 287(c)." This Article provides a com-
prehensive analysis of section 287(c)'s effects on domestic medical
and patent policies from a domestic perspective, as well as its in-
ternational impact.
Part I of this Article discusses patent law and the policy behind
the patent system. Part II examines whether enforceable medical
procedure patents create a unique conflict with the practice of
medicine such that those that practice medicine should be excused
from the patent laws. Part III highlights the main provisions of
section 287(c), including some of its deficiencies. Part IV argues
that Congress should repeal the immunity provision because it
compromises the patent policy of encouraging innovation, estab-
lishes a questionable precedent for restricting patent rights in
other areas, and may violate international obligations.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Patent Law and Policy
The Constitution explicitly authorizes Congress to promote the
progress of science and useful arts by granting inventors the exclu-
sive right to their discoveries for a limited time. 3 Consistent with
this mandate, Congress enacted the Patent Act, which gives inven-
tors the right to exclude all others from their patented inventions
Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Or-
ganization [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
See, e.g., Burgoon, supra note 19, passim (describing legislation leading to adoption
of section 28 7 (c) without addressing any international implications). The few articles
that mention TRIPS in conjuncture with section 287(c), do so in a cursory fashion. See,
e.g., Mossinghoff, supra note 18, at 796-97 (noting that TRIPS issue has been raised and
arguing that "real-world practices" would result in no violation, but providing no analysis
of pertinent articles of TRIPS); Robert M. Portman, Legislative Restriction on Medical and
Surgical Procedure Patents Removes Impediment to Medical Progress, 4 U. BALT. INTELL PROP.
LJ. 91, 118-19 (1996) (noting that various groups have raised TRIPS issue, but have sum-
marily dismissed it).
SSee U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
2000] 609
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during the term of the patents3 if they meet the Patent Act's re-
quirements.3s In particular, the Patent Act requires that a pat-
entable invention (1) constitute patentable subject matter,ss (2)
satisfy the technical requirements of being new, useful, and nonob-
vious,34 and (3) contain a written description that discloses the in-
vention and enables others to practice it.ss These requirements are
designed to further the constitutional mandate of promoting inno-
vation.6
The United States Supreme Court has explained that the federal
patent system reflects a "carefully crafted bargain" - a social con-
tract between the inventor and society - that encourages innova-
tion and promotes increased knowledge in the public domain.37
The subject matter requirement encourages innovation by protect-
ing a broad array of subject matter38 Although a patent must dis-
close an invention that fits within at least one statutory class of sub-
ject matter, the classes are very broad and are expansively inter-
preted.3
3' See Patent Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109 ("An Act to Promote the Progress of Useful
Arts."); see also EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS:
AMERICAN PATENT LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, 1798-1836, at 35-36 (1998) (noting that
framers elected for system of providing exclusive rights, rather than other types of re-
wards known at time such as medals, tides or bounties).
" See 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 272 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Exclusivity is considered essen-
tial to 'stimulate ideas and the eventual development of further advances." Kewanee Oil
Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974).
See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
See id. (providing useful requirement); id. § 102 (1994) (providing novelty re-
quirement); id. § 103 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (providing nonobvious requirement).
The application that becomes a patent must disclose the invention with sufficient
definiteness such that someone of like ability - usually referred to as a person of "ordi-
nary skill in the art" - could replicate the invention by following the patent. See id. § 112
(1994). In addition, the application must disclose the best way of practicing the invention
known to the inventor at the time the application is filed. See id.
" See, e.g., Patent Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109 ("An Act to Promote the Progress of Useful
Arts") (current version in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder
Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989); KeWanee Oi, 416 U.S. at 481.
" See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 149; see also Cover v. Hydramatic Packing Co., 83 F.2d
1390, 1392-93 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting that patent system is balance between providing
incentives to create and commercialize without undue public costs such as inflated
prices).
' See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (noting that Congress in-
tended statutory subject matter to "include anything under the sun that is made by man,"
based upon committee reports accompanying 1952 Patent Act).
See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (stating that patentable subject matter includes any process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter); Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308-09. In
particular, it has been noted that the "subject-matter provisions of the patent law have
been cast in broad terms to fulfill the constitutional and statutory goal of promoting 'the
610
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The technical patentability requirements ensure the validity of
this social contract by mandating that the inventor disclose some-
thing of value to society in exchange for the patent.4 The Patent
Act, thus, requires that an invention be not only new, but nonobvi-
ous.41 The disclosure requirement ensures that the public will be
informed of the invention. Further, because an issued patent is a
public document, it immediately benefits the public by, for exam-
ple, aiding the innovation of others that become informed of the
innovation.42 In addition, the disclosure requirement, together
with the limited patent term, ensures that the invention will ulti-
mately be in the public domain."
B. Patent Law, Policy, and Medical Procedures
Allowing patents on medical procedures is consistent with the
policy of encouraging innovation in all fields" and with the specific
categories of patentable subject matter in the Patent AcL Because
a medical procedure constitutes a process 6- one of the categories
of patentable subject matter 7 - it is patentable. Further, that
medical procedures fall within the scope of patentable subject mat-
ter is now well established." Although medical procedure patents
Progress of Science and the useful Arts' with all that means for the social and economic
benefits envisioned byJefferson." Id. at 315.
SSee, e.g., Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 480-81. (noting that patent protection requires
public disclosure by inventor).
" See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994); id. § 103 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); see also Bonito Boats,
489 U.S. at 156 (noting that "both the novelty and the nonobviousness requirements of
federal patent law are grounded in the notion that concepts within the public grasp, or
those so obvious that they readily could be, are the tools of creation available to all").
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 10-11, 13 (1994) (discussing availability of patents to public).
See id. §§ 112, 251 (1994); see also supra note 35 (explaining disclosure require-
ments of§ 112).
See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
A patentable "process," as defined in the Patent Act constitutes a "process, art, or
method, and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition
of matter, or material." Id. § 100 (1994).
See id. § 101.
The prohibition against medical procedure patents stemmed from the eighteenth-
century patent infringement case of Morton v. New Yor* Eye Infirmary. See 17 F. Cas. 879
(S.D.N.Y. 1862). Although Morton became viewed as establishing that medical procedures
were unpatentable subject matter, the case did not so hold. Rather, Morton held that the
patent on the use of ether for anesthesia to be invalid because the chemical composition
of ether had been previously known. See id. at 882. Moreover, others have suggested that
Morton was wrongly decided, or at least is no longer applicable in light of post-Morton
amendments to the Patent Act, clarifying that new uses of previously known compositions
could constitute a patentable process. See A. Samuel Oddi, Un-Unified Kconomic Theories of
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were once believed to be improper based on the 1862 case of Mor-
ton v. New York Eye Infirmaiy,9 the patentability of medical proce-
dures has been unchallenged, until Pali, because the Patent Of-
fice Board of Appeals held that medical procedures are patentable
in the 1954 decision of Ex parte Scherer.50 The Scherer court clarified
that: "it cannot be categorically stated that all such methods are
unpatentable subject matter merely because they involve some
treatment of the human body .... There is nothing in the patent
statute which categorically excludes such methods, nor has any
general rule of exclusion been developed by decisions.""' Although
some commentators have occasionally questioned the authoritative
value of this opinion,5 neither the courts nor the Patent and
Trademark Office ("PTO") have since questioned the patentability
of medical procedures that satisfy the technical requirements of
patentability.53
Patents - The Not-Quite-Holy Grai, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 267, 296-97 (1996) (noting that
prior to Morton, patents for new uses of known compounds were approved and codifica-
tion of definition of "process" under 1952 Patent Act further clarified appropriateness of
medical process patents).
17 F. Cas. 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1862).
103 U.S.P.Q. 107 (PaL Off. Bd. App. 1954).
' ld. at 109-10. The Board also clarified that the Morton decision, holding the patent
on the use of ether was invalid and was based on a lack of novelty, rather than improper
statutory subject matter. See id at 110. Therefore, Morton was not a sound basis to justify
the exclusion of medical procedures from patentability. See id.
See 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.03[3] (1998) (noting that Scherer
is "only a decision within the Patent Office" and "cannot be taken as strong authority for
the patentability of medical and surgical treatment methods generally"); Portman, supra
note 29, at 96.
' See, e.g., In re Cortright, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d 1464, 1466-69 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (discussing
whether claims to method of treating baldness through use of previously known com-
pound met written description requirement, without questioning patentability of subject
matter); Shearing v. Iolab Corp., 975 F.2d 1541, 1544-47 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (addressing
defendant's counterclaim to declare patent for method of inserting artificial lens into eye
invalid based on prior invention, obviousness, and failure to disclose best mode, without
questioning patentability of subject matter); C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular
Sys., Inc., 911 F.2d 670, 672-75 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (finding method of using catheter in
coronary angioplasty invalid based on prior art, but not questioning patentability of sub-
ject matter); In re Marshall, 578 F.2d 301, 304-05 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (reversing rejections
based on §§ 102 and 103 without addressing statutory subject matter); In re Ferens, 417
F.2d 1072, 1073-74 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (affirming rejection of claims to method and compo-
sition for hair growth for lack of utility, without raising statutory subject matter as issue);
Mehl/Biophile Int'l Corp. v. Milgraum, 8 F. Supp. 2d 434, 441-49 (D.N.J. 1998) (finding
patent for method of hair removal invalid because invention was anticipated by prior art,
without addressing whether patent was unpatentable subject matter); Exparte Balzarini, 21
U.S.P.Q.2d 1892, 1898 (P.T.O. Bd. Patent App. & Interferences 1991) (holding claims to
methods of treating human cells indefinite, and thus unpatentable, without addressing
patentability of subject matter); Chemetron Corp. v. Airco, Inc., 198 U.S.P.Q. 119 (N.D.
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II. RECONCILING PATENT POLICY WITH THE PRACTICE OF
MEDICINE
Although patent protection for medical procedures fulfills fun-
damental patent policies, it nonetheless has been argued that
medical procedures should be denied complete patent protection
because innovation in medical procedures does not need encour-
agement.'" In addition, it has been argued that patents, while fos-
tering innovation, conflict with countervailing policies that are im-
portant to the medical community. It has also been argued that
the sharing norm and the policy of promoting access are irrecon-
cilable with patent protection." However, despite these criticisms
that patents for medical procedures distort medical policies, these
policies are not so unique that a special exemption should apply to
the field of medicine.
A. Patent Policy
1. Domestic
Critics of patent protection for medical procedures assert that
these patents are unnecessary because innovation already occurs in
absence of the patent system.m Notably, the American Medical
Ill. 1976) (finding patent for method of removing drainage from bodies of patients recov-
ering from gastro-intestinal surgery invalid under §§ 102 and 103, without addressing
whether unpatentable as medical procedure in patent infringement action); Moraine
Prods., Inc. v. Block Drug Co., 318 F. Supp. 1064, 1065 (N.D. Ill. 1970) (finding simethi-
cone patent invalid based on public sale bar, without questioning that method of treating
flatulency symptoms was patentable subject matter).
Complete patent protection is denied if patents are not allowed or if patents are
not fully enforceable; for example, section 287(c) precludes complete patent protection
by denying full enforceability of patents. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (Supp. 111996). Accord-
ingly, arguments against the patenting of medical procedures are equally applicable to
arguments against enforcing medical procedure patents and will be treated as such in this
section. In particular, it is noted that although most of the arguments advanced by the
AMA focused on patentability, they are equally applicable to whether section 287(c) is
justifiable because the section may indirectly affect whether patents are obtained by sub-
stantially lessening or eliminating the incentive to obtain a patent.
See infra notes 103-06, 127, 134-36 and accompanying text.
However, even if patents are not necessary to enable the development of medical
procedures, patents can nonetheless be useful for medical research because patents may
provide funding for additional medical research in all areas. The financial benefits of
patent protection may be of interest to doctors as a means to enhance limited research
funding or operational expenses. This is particularly true as medical research has become
substantially more expensive, and public funding has become increasingly scarce. See,
e.g., Kenneth Sutherlin Dueker, Biobusiness on Campus: Commercialization of University-
Developed Biomedical Technologies, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 453, 458 (1997); Rebecca S.
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Association ("AMA") has argued that patent protection for medical
procedures is unnecessary because professional rewards and norms
outside the patent system already encourage inventive activity.57 To
this end, the AMA has noted the prohibition of medical procedure
patents in other countries. In addition, the AMA has asserted that
Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.
177, 196-97 (1987) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Proprietaiy Rights]. Indeed, the medical com-
munity has previously recognized the potential for patents to finance research. See, e.g.,
Gilbert Dalldorf, Sel-Support of Medical Science Through Patents, 235JAMA 29 (1976); see also
American Medical Association, Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Ethical Issues in the
Patenting of Medical Procedures, 53 FOOD & DRUG LJ. 341, 348 (1998) [hereinafter AMA,
Ethical Issues] (admitting that "once a process is patented and licensed... it is possible
that the royalty fees can be used to support the hospital and its investigators in further
research"); Coe A. Bloomberg et al., Patenting Medical Technology: "To Pwraote the Progress of
Science and Useful Arts," 317 NEw ENG.J. MED. 565, 567 (1987) (noting that"in these times
of decreasing grant allocations and reductions in federal and state medical insurance
reimbursement, the income derived from a hospital's research efforts when a royalty is
charged is often a welcome addition to a medical facility's budget"); Bernard D. Davis,
Profit Sharing Between Professon and the University, 304 N. ENG.J. MED. 1232 (1981); William
D. Noonan, Patenting Medical Inventions, PHAROS, at 6, 8 (Summer 1990).
" See AMA, Ethical Issues, supra note 56, at 349. However, the AMA's position regard-
ing whether patents are unnecessary for innovation has vacillated throughout history. At
the beginning of this century, the AMA opposed patenting of pharmaceuticals, medical
devices and medical procedures. See, e.g., F.E. Stewart, Is it Ethicalfor Medical Men to Patent
Medical Inventions?, 29JAMA 583, 585 (1897). Accordingly, the AMA supported legisla-
tion prohibiting not only medical procedures, but also medical apparati from patentabil-
ity. See H.R. 12451, 57th Cong. (Mar. 12, 1902) ('prohibiting patents on any 'art' of treat-
ing human disease . . . or upon any device adapted to be used in treatment of human
disease"). This opposition was founded largely on the fact that medicine was still an
undeveloped science; the AMA feared that the public would improperly perceive a patent
to be a stamp of government approval. See, e.g., Noonan, supra note 56, at 7-8; see also
William H. Edgerton, Medical Associations and Physicians' Patent Policies, in THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PATENT PRACTICE AND INVENTION MANAGEMENT 563 (Robert Calvert ed.,
1964) (noting that origin of controversy over patenting medical inventions is commonly
attributed to "patent medicine men," who sold cure-alls). Then, as medicine became
more of a certain science, the AMA softened its opposition to patents. See, e.g., id. at 564;
Noonan, supra note 56, at 8; see alsoJoel J. Garris, The Case for Patenting Medical Procedures,
22 AM. J.L. & MED. 85, 95 (1996) (analogizing AMA's drive to ban medical patents to
AMA's earlier view of surgical devices); William D. Noonan, Patenting Medical and Surgical
Procedures, 77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 651, 654-55 (1995) (discussing AMA's
vacillation regarding ethics of medical patents); Reisman, supra note 19, at 376-85 (ex-
plaining historical context of medical patents debate).
" See AMA, Ethical Issues, supra note 56, at 349. Although the AMA's specific argu-
ments regarding medical procedures are discussed here, it should also be noted that the
argument that patents are unnecessary has been made more generally with other
technologies. See, e.g., ERIC SCHIFF, INDUSTRIALIZATION WITHOUT NATIONAL PATENTS 34-
41, 96-106 (1971) (finding little evidence that lack of patent system hampered
industrialization in comparative study of nations with and without patent systems in
nineteenth and twentieth centuries); C.T. TAYLOR & Z.A. SILBERSTON, THE ECONOMIC
IMPACT OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 331-50 (1973) (noting that in survey of various industries,
importance of patent protection varied); see also William Kingston, Patent Protection for
Modern Technologies, 1997 INTELL. PROP. Q. 350, 357-58 (citing several industry studies
showing "very little" of industry research and development depends on patent
614
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patent protection impairs traditional methods of encouraging in-
novation in the medical community."
It has been suggested further that patent protection for medical
procedures is unnecessary because they are not costly to develop.6
This suggestion presumes that, in contrast to medical devices and
pharmaceuticals, medical procedures are developed during the
usual course of practice and, thus, require little investment of time
and resources.6' Medical procedure patents, the argument goes,
result in a windfall to inventors that invest little but receive the fi-
nancial benefit of a patent.62
But the presumption that medical procedures are distinct from
other medical innovations in their development costs is unsup-
ported. Although the development costs of new pharmaceuticals
are well documented,ss similar data on medical devices are not.
Those who have argued that medical devices are different from,
and more costly to develop than, medical procedures have cited
little evidence. 6" Moreover, it may be difficult to determine
of industry research and development depends on patent protection). However, the
results or conclusions derived from such studies have been criticized. See, e.g., Eisenberg,
Patents and the Progress of Science, supra note 2, at 1032-33. Moreover, the continued exis-
tence of the U.S. Patent Act, as well as enhanced patent protection world-wide through
means such as TRIPS, establish that patents are nonetheless believed to confer a net
benefit to society.
" See infra notes 103-06 (noting AMA's argument that patents interfere with publica-
tion process that typically serves as professional incentive to innovate).
SSee AMA REPORT, supra note 13, at 67 (noting that development of medical proce-
dures relies more on intellectual curiosity and creativity than capital for research and
development).
" See, e.g., id. (stating that "it is reasonable to claim that this level [of incentive]
would be significantly lower for procedures than it would be for devices and pharmaceuti-
cals"); Portman, supra note 29, at 111 (arguing that development of new medical proce-
dures occurs during physician's practice such that there is much less need for capital
investment).
SSee, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. S12,024 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Frist) (noting that allowing fees for use of new techniques to innovative would be 'wind-
fall" to doctors because innovations would have occurred anyway); 142 CONG. REc. H8277
(daily ed. July 24, 1996) (statement of Rep. Ganske) (suggesting that medical procedure
patents allow few doctors to get "windfall profits" at expense of patients).
' The cost of developing a single drug is notoriously high, with estimates exceeding
200 million dollars. See 141 CONG. REc. S15,221 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1995) (statement of
Sen. Hatch) (noting that cost usually exceeds 230 million dollars); PhRMA, Facts About
Pharmaceutical Industries (visited Feb. 6, 2000) <http://www.phrma.org/publications
/value/facts.html> (on file with author) (estimating that it takes average of 500 million
dollars to discover and develop single medication).
" See, e.g., Silvy A. Miller, Should Patenting of Surgical Procedures and Other Medical Tech-
niques by Physicians Be Banned?, 36 IDEA 255, 267 (1996) (outlining arguments by oppo-
nents of medical patents that royalties are justified for patents on devices for which re-
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whether medical devices are more costly to develop than medical
procedures because many medical inventions involve both a medi-
cal device and a procedure for using the device, so the two catego-
ries are actually interrelated.65
In addition, even if the cost of creating medical procedures were
less than the cost of creating new pharmaceuticals or medical de-
vices, this would not be an adequate legal justification for denying
patent protection to medical procedures. The patent laws do not
distinguish between inventions that require a substantial outlay of
capital investment and those that do not." Moreover, the Constitu-
search and development costs are justified, as well as manufacturing or distribution costs);
Portnan, supra note 29, at 11. Portman asserts that although development of drugs and
medical devices requires financial incentives, academic and career recognition have been
sufficient for developing medical process patents. See id Further, unlike devices, the
development of procedures occurs during the course of a doctor's practice; therefore,
there is much less need for significant capital investment. See id.; see also Beata Gocyk-
Farber, Note, Patenting Medical Procedures: A Search for a Compromise Between Ethics and Eco-
nomic, 18 CARDozo L. REv. 1527, 1554 (1997) (stating that "[b]ecause of the high re-
search and development costs of new drugs and medical devices, the rationale for drug
and medical devices patents is rarely questioned"); Wendy Yang, Note, Patent Policy and
Medical Procedure Patents: The Case for Statutoy Exclusion fim Patentability, I B.U. J. SCI. &
TEcH. L. 5, 26 (1995) (stating that incentives for innovation and investment in research,
development and marketing are necessary for drugs and devices, but not procedures,
based solely on statement of one doctor). But see Steven L. Nichols, Note, Hippocrates, the
Patent-Holder: The Unenforeability of Medical Procedure Patents, 5 GEO. MASON L. REv. 227,
245 (1997) (noting that paradox exists in distinction between patentability of devices
versus processes because arguments against medical procedure patents could also apply to
medical device and drug patents).
' See supra note 39 and accompanying text (noting that inventions may fit within at
least one statutory class of subject matter such that medical patents may claim both medi-
cal procedures and devices).
The patent statute provides one uniform standard for all inventions - they must
be new, useful, and nonobvious. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (providing useful require-
ment); id. § 102 (1994) (providing novelty requirement); id. § 103 (1994 & Supp. IV
1998) (providing nonobvious requirement). These provisions do not, however, include
any requirement regarding commercial expense. See id. §§ 101-03; see also Panduit Corp.
v. Dennison, 810 F.2d 1561, 1573-74 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("The law must be the same for all
patents and types of inventions. A level playing ground for the marketplace of ideas is as
necessary for technological innovation as it is for politics and social policy."). One could
argue that patents should be linked to amount of investment. However, such an argu-
ment would apply to all inventions and notjust medical procedures. Moreover, an analy-
sis of whether the patent system should consider this is tangential to the scope of this
Article. However, this idea has been suggested. See, e.g., Gocyk-Farber, supra note 64, at
1558-61 (proposing amendment to Patent Act requiring applicants seeking to patent
medical procedures to demonstrate that development of procedure would require
substantial funding in research and development). See generally Mark D. Janis, Second Tier
Patent Protection, 40 HARv. INT'L L.J. 151 (1999) (suggesting that patent protection be tied
to innovation and proposing shorter patent term for inventions having lower levels of
innovation). In addition, such distinction might create problems with international
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tion - the foundation of the United States patent system - does
not make the economic value of an inventor's discovery a predicateS 67
for patent protection.
Although the patent system was never intended to be the sole in-
spiration for the creation of inventions, it may encourage and ac-
celerate innovation in the medical procedure area. As the Su-
preme Court has noted, innovation will occur regardless of patent
protection,6 but patent protection is nonetheless important be-
cause it "may determine whether research efforts are accelerated
by the hope of reward or slowed by want of incentives... ."6 Thus,
while the development of some medical procedures may not re-
quire capital funding, other medical procedures could remain un-
derdeveloped or develop at a slower rate without the patent incen-
tive.m As former PTO Commissioner Bruce Lehman noted:
"[H]istorically, surgical procedures are not patented. When they
are, it is usually because it is required as part of a business plan to
attract the necessary capital for research and development." Even
the AMA has admitted that, without the patent incentive, some
procedures might not become available.7
The best-known example of a medical procedure that could not
have been developed without patent protection is Surrogate Em-
bryo Technology ("SET"). SET is a procedure for assisted repro-
duction that received funding from a private company that eventu-
ally patented the process.m Without that financing, the necessary
agreements requiring that patents be issued if they satisf the patentability requirements
of being new, useful and nonobvious. SeeTRIPS, supra note 28, art. 27(1).
', See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (containing no qualification to types of useful arts
that are to be promoted by exclusive protection).
' See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 317 (1980) (noting that "[t]he large
amount of research that has already occurred when no researcher had sure knowledge
that patent protection would be available suggests that legislative or judicial fiat as to
patentability will not deter the scientific mind from probing into the unknown any more
than Canute could command the tides").
- Id.
" See AMA REPORT, supra note 13, at 65.
71 See, e.g., Hearings on S.507 Before the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary, 105th Cong., 1st
Reg. Sess. (1997) (statement of Bruce Lehman, PTO Commissioner). Similarly, Cedars-
Sinai Medical Center noted that 'products and medical processes that might otherwise
have languished in the published literature have been patented and made available to the
community by patent licensees." Bloomberg, supra note 56, at 567.
See AMA REPORT, supra note 13, at 65.
" Carol Cancila, Frst Embryo Transfer Baby Born, AM. MED. NEWS, Feb. 17, 1984, at 3,
17; Embryo Transfer Technique Patent Questioned by Rep. Gore, BLUE SHEET, Aug. 22, 1984, at
4.
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research that led to SET could not have been accomplished be-
cause government funding was not available, and the doctors in-
volved in the research were reluctant to pass the cost of the re-
search to the individual patients.4 The development of SET illus-
trates the importance of patent protection in the area of medical
procedures. 5 Without this protection, the pace of innovation may
be slowed or altogether halted.
2. International
Critics of medical procedure patents have also argued that be-
cause other countries prohibit such patents to some degree, the
United States should follow suit.76 The practices or policies of
other nations, however, are not directly applicable to United States
domestic policy. Moreover, even in countries that restrict medical
procedure patents, the restrictions are not as absolute as the literal
exclusions suggest,7 and the policy justifications are questionable.7
Although many countries restrict the patentability of medical
procedures to some extent, the manner and scope of that restric-
" See, e.g., George J. Annas, Surrogate Embryo Transfer: The Perils of Patenting, 14
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 25, 25 (1994).
,s See, e.g., AMA REPORT, supra note 13, at 65-67 (acknowledging that SET example
demonstrates that patents can provide necessary incentive). One doctor who patented a
new method of heart bypass surgery discovered that the patent enabled him to attract the
attention and funding needed to explore the patented idea. See, e.g., Chartrand, supra
note 6, at D2. Although the idea ultimately was discovered to be unworkable on a large
scale, the doctor did note that "the idea was only explored because. .. I patented... so
this company felt they could expend themselves because if it were proven successful they
would be able to recoup their money and make a lot more." Id.; see also Paul Tarini, In-
ventive Approach May Be The Answer. Some Physicians Turn Ideas Into Patents, AM. MED. NEws,
Oct. 6, 1989, at 13, 16 (describing one doctor whose perspective on patenting changed
after he realized that royalties from one patent allow more research opportunities and
also because patents are known to be more attractive to companies which are needed to
bring invention to attention of medical community).
'6 See, e.g., Reisman, supra note 19, at 360-61; see also Congressional Hearings on H.R
1127 and H.R 2419, supra note 13, at 56 (statement of Charles Kelman, President, Ameri-
can Society of Cataract and Refractive Surgery) (noting that over 80 countries have
banned medical procedure patents); Notice of Hearings and Requests for Comments on
Issues Relating to Patent Procedures For Therapeutic and Diagnostic Methods, 61 Fed.
Reg. 10320, 10322-23 (Mar. 13, 1996) (noting Rep. Moorhead's statement that many
industrialized countries exclude medical procedure patents). According to the AMA,
medicine advanced rapidly between World War II and the late 1970s despite an alleged
lack of patents for medical procedures. AMA REPORT, supra note 13, at 66. However,
patent protection was indeed available at that time. See supra note 31 and accompanying
text (noting that Congress enacted Patent Act in 1790).
" See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
7' See infra notes 87-93 and accompanying text.
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tion is far from uniform." Some countries have determined medi-
cal procedures to be per se unpatentable, 80 while other countries
have declared that these procedures are not inventions as a legal
matter.8' Moreover, identically worded exclusions are subject to
different interpretations from nation to nation.8
The exclusion of medical procedures first became well estab-
lished in Europe when a number of European nations signed the
European Patent Convention ("E.P.C.") in 1974.83 Article 52(4)
of the E.P.C. explicitly provides that medical procedures do not
have "industrial applicability,"" which is defined as something
capable of use in any industry.85 The E.P.C. requires that a pat-
ented invention have industrial applicability;8 therefore, the
E.P.C. excludes medical procedures from patentability based on
the premise that medicine is not an industry. Both the medical
exclusion and its underlying presumption that medicine is not an
Although the statutory exception may be identically worded, courts have inter-
preted the exclusion differently. See, e.g., infra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
0 See generally German Patent Act 2(b) (2); French Patent Act 4(2); British Patent Act;
Willy De Smet, Patentability in the Area of Therapy and Diagnosis Under Belgian Lawv, 22 INT'L
REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L 888, 889 (1991) (noting that although Belgian law
does not literally exclude medical procedures, it has de facto excluded them because it
requires that invention be "susceptible of exploitation as an industrial or commercial
product" and medicine is deemed not industrial or commercial).
" See, e.g., Denmark Patent Act 1(3) (stating that " [m]ethods for the treatment of the
human or animal body by surgery or therapy and diagnostic methods practiced on the
human or animal body shall also not be regarded as inventions"); Italian Patent Act 12(4)
(excluding from definition of invention "methods for surgical or therapeutical treatment
of the human or animal body and diagnostical methods applied to the human or animal
body"); Swedish Patent Act 1 (excluding from definition of invention "[m]ethods for
surgical or therapeutic treatment or diagnostic methods, practiced on humans or ani-
mals").
' See infra notes 95-96 and accompanying text (noting inconsistent case law under
E.P.C. regarding interpretation of exclusion).
See Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 270
[hereinafter E.P.C.]. The E.P.C. is a procedural convention for obtaining patents in
E.P.C. member countries with only one patent application. See id. art. 1. Although pat-
ents can still be obtained through a national patent office, the European Patent Office,
which governs applications pursuant to the E.P.C., provides a more efficient mechanism.
However, enforcement is still governed by national laws. See id arts. 64(3), 138.
" Id. art. 52(4) (stating that "[m]ethods for treatment of the human or animal body
by surgery or therapy and diagnostic methods practiced on the human or animal body
shall not be regarded as inventions which are susceptible of industrial application within
the meaning of paragraph 1").
0 See id. art 57; see also EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, GUIDELINES FOR EXAMINATION IN
THE EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, ch. IV, pt. C, 4.1 (1994) [hereinafter EPO GUIDELINES]
("An invention shall be considered as susceptible of industrial application if it can be
made or used in any kind of industry, including agriculture.").
U SeeE.P.C., supra note 83, arts. 52(1),57.
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industry have been roundly criticized as being inconsistent with
the realities of modem medicine.Y
Despite this criticism, the medical procedure exclusion has be-
come entrenched, effectively precluding legislatures of many
European countries from reexamining the exclusion despite its
dubious rationale." Countries that are signatories to the E.P.C.89
have amended their patent laws to be consistent with the E.P.C.
without necessarily considering the implications of the exclu-
sion.90 But the E.P.C. provision does not necessarily reflect an
independent determination by its drafters to exclude medical
procedures as a matter of policy.9'
8 See, e.g., Case N-116/85 (Pigs I), 1989 OFFIcIALJ. EUR. PAT. OFF. 13, reprinted in 2O
INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 188, 191 (EPO Tech. Bd. App. 1989) (noting
that "the wording of paragraph 4 [of article 52] implicitly recognizes that such methods
are susceptible of industrial application as a matter of reality, but provides that they 'shall
not be regarded as' inventions which are susceptible of industrial application by way of
legal fiction"); see also Clement Payraudeau, Recent Decisions of the EPO Technical Boards of
Appea, 20 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 362, 365 (1989) (noting that distinc-
tion between medical and industrial applications is inherently subjective one that is diffi-
cult to determine).
Before the enactment of the E.P.C., some countries included provisions in their
patent acts to limit patenting such procedures. Although some courts questioned
whether this was appropriate, they felt constrained to follow the statutory exclusion, re-
gardless of whether the policy implications seemed justifiable. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co.s
Application, 1975 Rep. Pat., Design, & Trademark Cases 438, 438-39 (1974) (noting that
"[t]he reasons for such an exclusion appear to us to be based in ethics rather than in
logic but if there is to be a change in policy, which would appear to us to be sensible, this
ought in our view to be effected by legislation rather than by interpretation"); Upjohn Co.
Application, 1977 RPC 94 (1977) (noting that if law should be changed, legislature must
do so).
" Although membership in the E.P.C. and European Union ("EU") overlaps, the
E.P.C. and the EU are not identical. Compare European Patent Office, EPO Member States
(visited Apr. 7, 2000) <http://www.european-patent-office.org/epo/members.htn> (on
file with author) (listing countries governed under E.P.C.), with The European Union,
The Member States (visited Apr. 7, 2000) <http://www.eurunion.org/states/index.htm> (on
file with author) (listing European Union countries).
" See, e.g., Alan W. White, Patentability of Medical Treatment: Welcome Foundation's
(Hitching's) Application, EuR. INTELL. PROP. REV., Nov. 1980, at 364 (noting that UK patent
act was amended to be consistent with E.P.C. "without any consideration of the question
whether it is in the national interest to grant, or not to grant, patents for this type of
invention."); see also EPO GUIDELINES, supra note 85, at 42 (stating that "the intention of
Art. 52(4) is only to free from restraint non-commercial and non-industrial medical and
veterinary activities").
" Rather, this limitation was one of several E.P.C. articles based primarily on the
previous Strausbourg Convention. The Strasbourg Convention, in turn, contained provi-
sions that some members had previously adopted without evaluating policy reasons anew.
See, e.g., EDWARD ARMITAGE & IVOR DAVIS, PATENTS AND MORALITY IN PERSPECTIVE 16-17
(1994).
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Although E.P.C. countries have adopted the medical procedure
exclusion, the appropriateness of the exclusion has been ques-
tioned and limited by judicial interpretation." One commentator
recently stated that it is "difficult... to find sufficient justification
for the prohibition on patenting medical methods" and thus con-
cluded that "[f]or valid reasons legal experts have therefore re-
peatedly demanded that the prohibition on patenting medical
methods be dropped."93 Although the exclusion is unlikely to be
eliminated entirely from the E.P.C. because of the well-known
difficulties in securing the necessary consensus for any E.P.C.
amendment, 94 patents for medical procedures are nonetheless
granted in some instances through narrow interpretation of the
exclusion.95 However, this has yielded inconsistent decisions and
unpredictability in the area of medical procedures.9
See infra note 95 (citing cases allowing medical procedure patents through narrow
interpretation of exclusion).
Rainer Moufang, Methods of Medical Treatment Under Patent Law, 24 INT'L REV.
INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 18, 48-49 (1993) (arguing that prohibition against patent-
ing medical procedures is unsound and should be eliminated in E.P.C. system); see also
Richard Apley, Letter to the Editor Regarding: William D. Noonan, MD, JD, 'Patenting Medical
and Surgical Procedures," 77JPTOS 651 (1995), 77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOCY 900,
901-02 (1995); Jochen Pagenberg, Comentaiy on T 245/87 (Siemens Ag - Flow Measure-
ments), 20 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L 882 (1989) (noting that in era when
WIPO is attempting to minimize subject matter restrictions on patentability, E.P.C. should
at least be interpreting its exclusions restrictively, rather than broadly); White, supra note
90, at 367 (suggesting that appropriateness of E.P.C. provision be revisited in light of
decision of New Zealand court in Wellcome Foundation that method of treating leukemia
was properly patentable as method of new manufacture).
" In addition, section 287(c) further reduces this likelihood because those who
advocated eliminating the medical procedure prohibition used to rely on United States
patent laws that allowed full patentability and enforceability. See Moufang, supra note 93,
at 48.
's T 329/94, Blood Extraction Method, 1998 OFFICiALJ. EUR. PAT. OFF. 241, reprinted in
29 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L 694, 696-97 (1998) (finding that blood ex-
traction method was not precluded from patentability under article 52(4) because there
was no therapeutic purpose or effect where purpose was to improve "efficiency of taking
blood from a donor"); T 143/94, Trigoneiline, 1996 OFFIcIAL J. EUI. PAT. OFF. 430, re-
printed in 28 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 95 (1997) (finding no prohibition
against patentability under article 52(4) where claim was for use of composition in pro-
duction of compound even if compound would have therapeutic use); T 74/93, Contracep-
tive Method/British Technology Group, 1995 OFFICIALJ. EUR. PAT. OFF. 712, reprinted in 27
INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 99, 101-102 (1996) (finding patent on method of
contraception not excluded under article 52(4) because pregnancy is not illness and its
prevention is not therapy).
' The determination of patentability often depended on narrow construction of
patent claims. See, e.g., T820/92, Contraceptive Method, 1995 OFFICIALJ. EUR. PAT. OFF.
113, 114, reprinted in 26 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 543 (1995) (finding
contraceptive method unpatentable because portion of claim, although not main part,
constitutes method of eliminating negative consequences, despite authority that there is
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Finally, even if other nations had sound reasons for excluding
medical procedures from patentability, those policies do not neces-
sarily justify denying these patents in the United States. The
United States has traditionally favored stronger patent protection
than other nations.9 In fact, the United States has often departed
from international norms to serve its own domestic policies.98 For
example, in the recent TRIPS negotiations, the United States pro-
posed that all subject matter be patentable, including medical pro-
cedures, although most other nations opposed that concept."
Promoting domestic policies, rather than directly applying policies
of other nations, is more consistent with the United States patent
policy of encouraging innovation by providing exclusive rights
within the nation.
B. Medical Practice
Although patent protection may be necessary to foster innova-
tion, a closer examination of the impact of patents on medical
practice is necessary to determine whether medical procedure pat-
no prohibition for inventions that have both therapeutic and cosmetic purpose);
T290/86, Cleaning Plaque/ICl, 1992 OFFICIALJ. EUR. PAT. OFF. 414, 420-21, reprinted in 23
INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 815 (1991) (finding method of cleaning plaque
unpatentable as method of treatment because it had curative effect, although it also had
cosmetic effect, despite some authority that method with both cosmetic and therapeutic
effect patentable on basis that prior case only claimed cosmetic effect, and not therapeu-
tic effect); T144/83, Appetite Suppressant/Du Pont 1986 OFFiCIALJ. EUR. PAT. OFF. 301,
304, reprinted in 18 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 258 (1987) (finding product
for promoting weight loss patentable despite its cosmetic and therapeutic effect). In
addition, prior to Ex parte Scherer, a similar problem of inconsistency was found in the
United States. See, e.g., In re Kettering, 35 U.S.P.Q. 342, 342 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1936)
(finding process and apparatus for creating fever patentable because method of creating
fever had no direct relation to curing specific disease); ExpareWappler, 26 U.S.P.Q. 191,
191(Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1934) (reversing examiner's rejection of claim to method of
shrinking living tissue by heating because claims were not directed to treatment of any
specific disease).
97 See United States Draft Agreement on the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG11/W/70 (May 11, 1990) [hereinafter United States
Draft Agreement], reprinted in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE
TRIPS AGREEMENT 420, 428 (Carlos M. Correa & Abdulqawi A. Yusuf eds., 1998).
" See infra notes 328,331 and accompanying text (describing United States efforts to
promote intellectual property protection worldwide). For example, one requirement
under United States patent law that does not appear likely to change in the near future is
the requirement that patent application disclose an inventor's "best mode" at the time an
application is filed. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994) (requiring best mode be revealed),
with TRIPS, supra note 28, art. 29 (suggesting, but not requiring, that best mode be in-
cluded).
See United States Draft Agreement, supra note 97, at 428.
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ents can be reconciled with the practice of medicine. Of course,
patent protection has some impact on the medical practice and its
norms; however, the very nature of the patent system is a compro-
mise between public access and exclusivity to maximize the public
welfare.'Ot Patents may actually have less impact on medical prac-
tice than the AMA alleges.01 Moreover, doctors' concerns regard-
ing medical procedures are similar to those raised by other scien-
tists;' °2 therefore, special rules, such as section 287(c), are ques-
tionable without considering the impact of patents in all fields of
technology.
1. The Sharing Norm
a. The Medical Profession
The AMA has argued that because medical ethics require doc-
tors to share information, medical procedures should not be pat-
entable or enforceable against doctors.'03 In particular, the AMA
has noted that sharing of scientific knowledge with colleagues and
others is fundamental to medical ethics.'" This sharing norm is
See Part IA (discussing policies of U.S. patent system).
101 In addition, medical procedure patents impact other scientists because doctors are
not the only ones to invent medical procedures. Although doctors would seem to be
obvious inventors, research scientists can and do conceive of patentable methods; just
because a research scientist may not be able to "treat" a patient does not mean the scien-
tist could not have a patentable procedure, or work with other doctors to create a pat-
entable procedure. See, e.g., Annas, supra note 74, at 25 (describing research team that
developed SET to include both researchers and medical doctors); Thomas C. O'Dowd &
Nick Bourne, Inventing a New Diagnostic Test for Vaginal Infection, BRITISH MED. J., July 2,
1994, at 140 (describing medical test invented by research scientists, rather than doctors).
However, scientists are not addressed separately because, as explained in this Section, the
issues essentially overlap with respect to patent concerns.
' See Eisenberg, Pmpidiey RigA supra note 56, at 181-84 (discussing sharing norm
typical of scientists).
't The textual basis for this argument is derived from the AMA Principle of Medical
Ethics and the AMA Code. In addition, the AMA believes that fully enforceable patents
endanger the sharing of information because doctors may fail to disclose new inventions
in order to secure the financial reward of a patent. This belief relies on two presump-
tions. First, it presumes that doctors would forgo the professional recognition inherent in
publication for potential financial reward. More importantly, it presumes that if a doctor
wants to obtain a patent, publication is precluded. However, publication and patenting
may occur concurrently, as will be addressed in this section. Therefore, this undermines
the first presumption, as well as the argument that patents reduce the sharing norm.
'0' The Principles of Medical Ethics states that: "A physician shall continue to study,
apply and advance scientific knowledge, make relevant information available to patients,
colleagues, and the public .... " American Medical Association, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL
ETHICS (1996).
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considered critical for the dissemination of new improvements and
the resulting enhancement of patient care.1"s Patents are said to
encourage violations of medical ethics because the Medical Ethics
Code ("Medical Code") prohibits withholding knowledge "for rea-
sons of personal gain."06
A patent, however, does not necessarily result in a personal gain
that violates the Medical Code. First, the Medical Code does not
condemn personal gain per se.' °7 Rather, the Medical Code criti-
cizes personal gain only if it compromises the dissemination of
knowledge.' 6 Even though the patent system provides the oppor-
tunity for financial benefit,'0 9 the patent system shares the same
goal as the Medical Code in promoting knowledge dissemination."
Patents, by statute, must sufficiently describe the invention to en-
The Code of Medical Ethics states that
Physicians have an obligation to share ... knowledge and skills and to re-
port the results of clinical and laboratory research .... This tradition en-
hances patient care, leads to early evaluation of new technologies, and
permits the rapid dissemination of improved techniques. The intentional
withholding of new medical knowledge, skills and techniques from col-
leagues for reasons of personal gain is detrimental to the medical profes-
sion and to society and is to be condemned.
New Medical Procedures, AMA Code of Medical Ethics § 9.08 (1998) [hereinafter AMA
Code].
AMA REPORT, supra note 13, at 61.
' AMA Code, supra note 105, § 9.08 (providing that "intentional withholding of new
medical knowledge ... for reasons of personal gain ... is to be condemned" but not
condemning all types of personal gain).
to e i&.
'm While the patent system provides an opportunity for personal gain, there is no
requirement that a patentee use a patent for personal gain. In fact, patentees of medical
inventions have been known to dedicate their patents to the public, or use licensing fees
to further additional medical research. For example, Cedars-Sinai has granted royalty-
free licenses to the American Red Cross for a method to inactivate acquired immunodefi-
ciency syndrome viruses in factor VIII concentrate. See Bloomberg, supra note 56, at 567;
see also Ducker, supra note 56, at 486 (citing Harvard Licensing Report FY 1977-87 as
showing that Harvard has maintained policy of dedicating patents in area of medical
therapeutics to public). In addition, while the AMA assumes that patenting will result in
personal gain, the AMA seems to discount the fact that doctors can economically benefit
from their inventions exclusive of the patent system. See, e.g., Robert Rosenberg & Bruce
L. Gewertz, Issues and Debate: The Usefulness of Medical Patents for Surgical Procedures, 10
ANNALS OF VASCULAR SURGERY 1, 3 (1996) (noting that "some surgeons offer their tech-
niques on confidential basis as part of exclusive and expensive seminars or promote pro-
prietary clinics where specially trained surgeons provide advanced care for those willing
to pay for 'the best'").
"o See supra notes 30-39 and accompanying text (discussing patent policies of encour-
aging innovations).
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able others to replicate the invention without undue experimenta-
tion."'
In a related context, the Medical Code recognizes that patents
are not inconsistent with the sharing norm by explicitly authorizing
doctors to patent medical devices.12 The Medical Code states that:
"A physician may patent a surgical or diagnostic instrument he or
she has discovered or developed. The laws governing patents are
based on the sound doctrine that one is entitled to protect one's
discovery.""13 In addition, no one, including those that object to
medical procedure patents, disputes whether medical devices are
proper subject matter for patents."'
b. Other Professions
The argument that patents on medical procedures negatively af-
fect the sharing norm is not unique to the medical profession.
Traditionally, all scientists and physicians share the results of their
research."' This sharing primarily occurs in peer-reviewed jour-
nals. In the past, scientists argued that the sharing norm would be
eroded by patent protection.
". See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994); see also Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc.,
802 F.2d 1367, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (noting that use of invention must be sufficiently
disclosed such that "undue experimentation" is not required).
"' See AMA Code, supra note 105, § 9.09.
.. Id. Notably, whether a medical device is developed during the routine course of
medical practice is not raised as an issue.
'" See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text (noting that patentability of medical
devices has been unquestioned since Ex parte Scherer decision in 1954).
"' See, e.g., Eisenberg, Proprietay Rights, supra note 56, at 183-84 (describing sharing
norm within scientific community).
"' For example, prior to Congressional action that encouraged universities to patent
inventions, there was a widespread belief among scientists that patents would preclude
traditional sharing of information via peer-reviewed publications. See, e.g., Franklin Pierce
Law Center's Sixth Biennial Patent System Major Problems Conference, 37 IDEA 623, 637 (1997)
[hereinafter Franklin Pierce Debates] (quoting Norman Balmer, chief patent counsel of
Union Carbide Corporation, who argued that AMA position is analogous to that of uni-
versity professors in 60s and 70s who opposed patents, but that this opposition has since
died down); Eisenberg, Proprietaiy Rights, supra note 56, at 181-82, 195-97 (noting that
prior to commercialization of biotechnology, universities were averse to patenting discov-
eries); see also GARY W. MATKIN, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND THE UNIVERSITY 56-76 (1990)
(describing history of patent policy at universities). The prior perception about the perils
of patenting is less prevalent, although it has not entirely been eliminated. See, e.g.,
Dueker, supra note 56, at 465 (quoting HARVARD UNIVERSITY, RESEARCH, DISCOVERY AND
THE REWARD OF INVENTION (1995)) (noting number of misperceptions including one that
patenting "creates an atmosphere of secrecy"); Ronald Kotulak, Taking License with Your
Genes; Biotech Firms Say They Need Protection, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 12, 1999, at 1 (noting that
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Outside of the medical field, however, patents have become
commonplace alongside publications in peer-reviewed journals.
Many universities and companies today have in-house patent coun-
sel and licensing departments, as well as uniform procedures for
patenting inventions and providing incentives to inventors.11 7 In
addition, and although still somewhat controversial in the scientific
community, patent protection of basic technology has not com-
pletely eroded the sharing norm or hindered research.""
Patenting and publication, in fact, may coexist. Inventors may
patent an invention and publish an article regarding the same in-
vention. The United States patent laws do not require that an in-
vention never be available in another forum, such as a journal, al-
though they do deny patents to inventors that unduly delay filing
of a patent application after publication. " g
there is concern that patents on genes and gene sequences will unduly restrict access to
genetic information).
1" See, e.g., MATKIN, supra note 116, at 81-99 (describing in-depth patent policies at
four major universities, including Penn State, which provides 1000 dollar bonus to scien-
tists that provide patentable invention); Dueker, supra note 56, at 464 (noting that enact-
ment of Bayh-Dole Act spurred creation of university technology transfer offices).
.. For example, the Cohen-Boyer patent, one of the early patents in the area of bio-
technology is routinely used by all who deal in the area of biotechnology because it relates
to basic gene-splicing and cloning techniques. See U.S. Patent No. 4,237,224 (Dec. 2,
1980) ("Process for Producing Biologically Functional Molecular Chimeras"); Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Gov-
eminent-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1710 (1996) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Public
Research and Private Development] (stating that "[t]he Cohen-Boyer patents have been
widely licensed to biotechnology firms and pharmaceutical firms"). Accordingly, many
biotechnology companies had to pay royalty fees, under terms that were not onerous and
permitted continued sharing of research. See, e.g., Eisenberg, Public Research and Private
Development, supra, at 1710; see also Robert M. Cook-Deegan, Origins of the Human Cenome
Project, 5 RISK: HEALTH SAFELTY & ENV'T 97, 117 (1994) (noting that Cohen-Boyer patent
covered central technique of molecular biology, but was licensed at relatively low fees).
In fact, companies developed other new technologies and flourished despite the royalty
payments. See Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development, supra, at 1710 (noting
that licensing was "on terms that have been set low enough that they have generated few
complaints from industry and have probably not created significant impediment to com-
mercial development"). However, whether this model is the exception rather than the
rule and whether it continues to be viable is the subject of some debate. See, e.g., Rebecca
S. Eisenberg, Technology Transfer and the Genome Project: Problems with Patenting Research
Tools, 5 RiSm HEALTH SAFETY & ENV'T 163 (1994) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Technology
Transfer]; Arti Rai, Regulating Scienti fc Research, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 77 (1999).
"' See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994) (providing grace period of up to one year after pub-
lication to file patent application). However, it should be noted that the United States is
more lenient in this respect than other nations. See, e.g., E.P.C., supra note 83, arts. 54-55,
158; see also LAN MUIR ET AL., EUROPEAN PATENT LAW: LAW & PROCEDURE UNDER THE
E.P.C. AND P.C.T. 152-62 (1999) (discussing novelty requirement). Nonetheless, it has
been questioned whether there may be an incentive to withhold research results until a
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Although publication may not negatively affect patent protec-
tion, patents are perceived to compromise the sharing norms in-
herent in publication. For example, some fear that dissemination
of information may be delayed because drafting and filing a patent
application may take a significant amount of time.l " However, a
potential publication delay does not eviscerate the sharing norm.
In fact, one recent study found that only a minority of researchers
thought that patent applications unduly delayed the normal publi-
cation process and concluded that any delay was insignificant.
21
Thus, an inventor can obtain a patent while achieving professional
recognition through journal publication. 22
In addition, patent protection actually promotes the sharing of
information by providing another avenue of information dissemi-
nation where publication is not possible.'" Under the Patent Act,
the PTO must issue patents if the application meets the technical
requirements of patentability.124 In contrast, publications have
page limits and other editorial considerations that may limit the
patent has been granted. See Eisenberg Proprietaiy Rights, supra note 56, at 216-17 (noting
that applicants may still be disinclined to publish in event that patent is denied).
'" See AMA REPORT, supra note 13, at 64.
. See generaly David Blumenthal et al., Withholding Research Results in Academic Life
Science: Evidence From a National Suroey of Faculty, 277 JAMA 1224 (1997) (finding that
about 20% of researchers reported that publication of their results had been delayed by
more than 6 months because of patent issues, but concluding that there is no general
problem with delayed publication due to patenting).
' Theodore Cooper & Joseph E. Galligan, The Anomaly as a Necessity: Academic-
industrial Collaboration in Research, I INT'L J. CARDIOLOGY, 449, 450-51 (1982). But see
Congressional Hearings on H.R. 1127 and H.R. 2419, supra note 13, at 46 (statement of Dr.
Jack Singer) (asserting that "free exchange of medical and surgical methods cannot coex-
ist with the monopoly-dependent exchange of the patent system," because of different
values and incentives, but providing no empirical support); Eisenberg, Proprietaiy Rights,
supra note 56, at 216-17 (noting risk to secrecy protection involved in publishing prior to
receipt of patent).
'" See McCormick, supra note 10, at 32 (suggesting that in some cases information can
only be disseminated through patent, such as when scientists are denied traditional publi-
cation); supra note 8 and accompanying text (describing this very situation for Dr. Pallin);
see also Lee Bowman, Physicians Stake Claims to their Art of Healing S.F. EXAMINER, July 16,
1995, at B1, B7 (asserting that there are "numerous reports of information and papers
withheld due to disputes over credit or fears of helping a research competitor at a crucial
moment").
' See generally 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994) (stating that "[a] person shall be entitled to a
patent" unless technical patentability requirements are not met) (emphasis added). The
one exception to this provision is if issuance of a patent on an invention threatens na-
tional security. See id. § 181 (1994). However, even in this case, the statute presumes that
a patent will eventually issue. See id. (describing procedure that must be followed in or-
dering secrecy of invention: PTO may only withhold grant for designated one year period,
and additional extensions must be approved).
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number and type of articles they publish.' 5 For example, the Jour-
nal of the American Medical Association, a well-respected peer-
reviewed journal in the medical community, reports that it only
publishes about ten percent of unsolicited manuscripts.12
2. Peer Review
Even if patents do not preclude publication, some argue, they
may effectively prohibit publication because of the potential for
liability. In particular, there is a concern that peer reviewers will
not review articles on patented medical procedures for fear of be-
ing sued for patent infringemenLt' Peer review is particularly im-
portant for medical procedures because there is no governmental
agency that monitors their safety and effectiveness.
15
But patents are unlikely to preclude peer review. Because the
patent application process is lengthy,'" peer review is likely to oc-
cur before a patent issues, provided that the patent and the corol-
lary article are submitted simultaneously. A patentee does not have
" See, e.g., Information for Contributors, So. MAG. (visited Apr. 29, 2000)
<http//www.sciencemag.org/misc/con-info.shtrml> (on file with author). Science Maga-
zine, a peer-reviewed journal, notes that not only are manuscripts evaluated for "technical
merit," but also that an attempt is made to "balance subject matter" of a particular issue.
See id; see also Information for Authors, J. CATARACT & REFRACrIVE SURGERY (visitedJan. 25,
2000) <http://www.ascrs.org/publications/crs/auth-info.html> (on file with author)
(stating criteria as suitability of subject matter, "originality" of content, and timeliness);
Getting Published in Nature, NATURE (visted Jan. 25, 2000) <http://www.nature.com/
author/htgpin.html> (on file with author) [hereinafter Nature Publication Guidelines]
(noting that one of requirements was "interest to an interdisciplinary readership" as well
as originality and outstanding scientific importance).
m See Authors Instructiow, JAMA (visited Jan. 25, 2000) <http://www.jama.ama-
assn.org/info/auinst.html> (on file with author); see also Nature Publication Guidelines,
supra note 125 (noting that only 10% of submitted papers are published).
" See, e.g., AMA REPORT, supra note 13, at 63 (noting that patents restrict peer review
because study of patented procedures may require payment of licensing fees); Congres-
sional Hearings on H.R. 1127 and H.R 2419, supra note 13, at 58-59 (statement of Dr.
Charles Kelman); Annas, supra note 74, at 25.
" See, e.g., AMA REPORT, supra note 13, at 63 (stating that peer review acts as "pri-
mary regulatory mechanism for medical processes"). The FDA is empowered to regulate
pharmaceuticals for human or animal use, as well as medical devices. See Federal Food,
Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(d), (g), (h), 351-60, 371(a) (1994 & Supp. IV
1998); 21 C.F.R. § 510(a)(1) (1998) (delegating functions vested in Secretary for Health
by FFDCA to Commissioner of FDA).
' The PTO typically takes 18 months to review a patent application and generally
takes considerably longer for more complex technologies. See, e.g., AMA REPORT, supra
note 13, at 64 (noting that patent process often takes years to complete).
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the right to exclude others until the patent issues;" thus, while a
patent application is pending, peer review can occur without con-
cem for infringement""
Further, peer review is common in other scientific fields despite
the existence of patents. The preservation of peer review, there-
fore, is possible with measures less drastic than a blanket immunity
provision. In addition, an exception from patent infringement for
peer review could extend from the generally recognized, but pres-
ently limited exception for experimental use." In any case, patent
protection no more affects medical procedures than it does any
discipline that encourages peer review.'"
3. Access to Medical Care
The strongest argument for special treatment of medical proce-
dure patents is that fully enforceable patents could limit access to
necessary medical treatment." Doctors have asserted that medical
See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); see also Cohen v. United States, 487
F.2d 525, 527 (Ct. CI. 1973) (noting that "there can be no infringement of a patent prior
to its issuance"). Moreover, the inventor may never have a right to exclude others if the
PTO determines that the invention is not patentable.
" The foregoing arguments presume that a doctor would desire to publish the new
procedure in a peer-reviewedjournal. As noted, patent protection does not foreclose that
option; however, a doctor may forgo publication and attempt to keep the method as a
trade secret to maintain exclusivity without utilizing the patent system. See AMA REPORT,
supra note 13, at 66 (reporting precedent for keeping medical inventions as trade se-
crets); see also HAROLD SPEERT, OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY. A HISTORY & ICONOGRAPHY
270-72 (1994) (discussing refusal of several generations of Chamberlen family to reveal
discovery of obstetrics forceps). Concealing an invention harms the public interest more
than patent protection because a patent at least informs the public of the invention;
further, the information discussed in a patent automatically becomes part of the public
domain once the patent term expires. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994); id. § 154 (1994 & Supp.
IV 1998); Davis, supra note 56, at 1233 (noting that "secrecy is widespread in highly com-
petitive fields of even the purest research" and that in long run, patents actually reduce
need for secrecy); Eisenberg, Proprietwy Rights, supra note 56, at 185, 194-95 (noting that
patents are preferable to alternatives of trade secrecy or actual secrecy).
"See AMA REPORT, supra note 13, at 63; TimothyJ. McCoy, Biomedical Process Patunts:
Should They Be Restricted by Ethical Limitations?, 13J. LEGAL MED. 501, 513 (1991) (propos-
ing experimental use doctrine as a way to allow investigational uses of patented technol-
ogy to accommodate peer review); Public Hearing, supra note 19 (including debate over
use of experimental use doctrine).
" See, e.g., Eisenberg, Proitaiy Rights, supra note 56, at 217-26 (noting that expan-
sion of experimental use doctrine might soften exclusivity of patent rights and thereby
reduce tension between patent and research interests).
", See, e.g., AMA REPORT, supra note 13, at 62. Doctors have also alleged that medical
education is threatened by the enforcement of patented processes because teachers and
students will be restricted from access to necessary procedures. See id. at 64. This is essen-
tially the same argument that has been made regarding the practice of doctors being
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procedure patents may hinder their ability to use protected proce-
dures'35 and that, at a minimum, a fear of liability will chill their
treatment decisions.'%
Total preclusion would occur if a doctor were denied a license or
if a court imposed an injunction against the doctor forbidding the
doctor from using a patented process. However, neither of these
situations is likely to occur. First, there are no known cases in
which the owner of a medical procedure patent refused to license a
patent.137 In fact, a patent owner has a financial incentive to license
the invention at a reasonable costiss Moreover, even if a patent
restricted. Accordingly, all of the arguments for reconciling patents and medical practice
should be equally applicable.
' However, it should be noted that not all doctors agree that restricted access to
patented procedures is necessarily harmful to patient care because a patent owner may
assist in ensuring proper use of technology in a field in which there is no government
regulation. SeeAnnas, supra note 74, at 26.
' The issue of whether medical procedure patents will impact doctor decisions con-
cerning what treatment to use is likely to arise in instances where someone other than the
patentee wants to use the treatment. A doctor's decision concerning medical treatment
is unlikely to be biased toward any treatment patented by the doctor himself because a
doctor receives no compensation for using his own invention. Even if a doctor were to
promote a use that she has patented for pecuniary reasons alone, the medical profession
code of ethics would seem to prevent such a possibility because doing so would not neces-
sarily be in the patient's best interest. See AMA Code, supra note 105, § 8.03 (noting that
"[u]nder no circumstances may physicians place their own financial interests above the
welfare of their patients").
'" See, e.g., Congressional Hearings on H.R. 1127 and H.R. 2419, supra note 13, at 89
(statement of Michael Kirk, representing the ABA) (noting that proponents of banning
medical procedure patents "have never been able to point to any concrete examples of
patients who were at risk of not having the benefits of the patented surgery technique").
', See Annas, supra note 74, at 26 (noting that doctors working on SET believed that
patent actually encouraged increased access to technology because profit motive encour-
aged patent owners to license); Dave Melzer, Patent Protection for Medical Technologies: Why
Some and Not Others?, LANCET, Feb. 14, 1998, at 518, 518 (noting that opposition to surgi-
cal patents is irrational and emotional in light of reality that such patents would always be
appropriately licensed due to commercial and social pressures); see also Stem Cell Research,
Patenting &' Health Implications: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labo, Health and Human
Services, Education &' Related Agencies of the Senate Appropriations Comm., 106th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1999), available in 1999 WL 9929, at *7 (statement of Todd Dickinson, PTO Com-
missioner) (noting that "[w]hile some speculate that patent owners may refuse to license
or exclusively license [to] others ... market realities and/or good will almost always re-
solve this problem"); Commercialize Federally Owned Inventions: Hearings on H.R. 2544 Before
he House Subcomm. on Technology of the House Comm. on Science, 105th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1998), available in 1998 WL 122527 (statement of Raymond Kammer, Director of Na-
tional Institute of Standards and Technology) (noting that licensing of patented inven-
tions are regulated by market forces such that exclusive licenses which hinder sharing are
reduced). In addition, public pressure may also play a role in ensuring that licenses be
reasonable. See, e.g., Seth Shulman, Cashingln on Medical Knowledg, TECH. REV., Mar. 13,
1998, at 38, 42 (noting that litigation was never issue after American College of Radiology
publicly condemned patent as invalid); see also Evan Ackiron, Note, Patents for Critical
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owner were to attempt to enforce a patent against a doctor,'" a
court would not enforce it if public health would be
compromised.'4
The potential of restricted access is the more likely problem. In
particular, the AMA suggests that fully enforceable patents would
create a chilling effect that would deter doctors from using pat-
ented, or even newer, technology. 4" The AMA argues that doctors
may use an older procedure because they cannot easily determine
what is patented or what constitutes patent infringement.
Pharmaceuticals: The AZT Case, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 145, 146 (1991) (noting that price of
AZT dropped by two-thirds after public outcry).
" This assumes that a patent holder both is aware of a doctor's use and elects to sue
the doctor. However, patent owners typically are not aware of such use. See, e.g., C. Ber-
man & N. Lambrecht, Medical Patents in the United States, 10 MANAGING INTELL. PROP. (July
1991); see also Congrssional Hearings on H.R. 1127 and H.R 2419, supra note 13 (statement
of William Noonan) (noting that medical procedure patents are impractical to enforce
because of both difficulties in detecting infringement and need to litigate many suits
against individual doctors); Miller, supra note 65, at 260 (noting that there is no easy way
to determine infringement although patients can be asked about surgical method, or
patients' operating reports can be examined). Two exceptions to this would be if a doc-
tor publishes an article claiming the patented invention as his own, or if the doctor
sought a license from the patent holder but either was denied a license or elected not to
take a license because the royalty was considered to be too high. However, the Pailin suit
is the only one known to have occurred because of a publication. See supra note 8 and
accompanying text. In addition, a patent owner may elect to sue a company who is con-
tributing to or inducing a doctor's infringement by supplying the materials for infringe-
ment, rather than the individual doctor who is directly infringing. See, e.g., Kendall Co. v.
Progressive Med. Tech., 85 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (involving patent holder that sued
supplier of replacement sleeves for contributory infringement of patented medical device,
rather than doctor); Allergan Sales Inc. v. Pharmacia & Upjohn Inc., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1283,
1287 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (involving patent owner that sued for contributory infringement,
rather than doctor); see also McCormick, supra note 10, at 33 (noting that owner of medi-
cal procedure sued manufacturers for training doctors to infringe, rather than doctors
who were directly infringing). This is particularly true when the patent owner is a corpo-
ration that manufactures and sells medical supplies - in such a case, suing doctors would
only result in negative relations with their key customers. See, e.g., Congressional Hearings
on H.R 1127 and H.R. 2419, supra note 13, at 92-100 (statement of Dr. Frank Baldino,
President and CEO of Cephalon, Inc.) (noting that "[i]t would make no sense to bring an
infringement action against the very people for whom we work to develop these treat-
ments").
" It is within a court's equitable discretion to decide whether or not the doctor
should be enjoined from using the patented procedure. Indeed, there are cases in which
courts have declined to issue injunctions from use of patented inventions for public
health and safety concerns. See infra note 208 and accompanying text (regarding imposi-
tion of injunctions).
"' See, e.g., AMA REPORT, supra note 13, at 62-63.
See id. However, this situation should be precluded by medical ethics which re-
quire that the patient's best interests not be compromised. See, e.g., AMA Code, supra
note 105, § 8.03. Moreover, even if an "unethical" doctor were to choose the unpatented
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Although the argument that medical procedure patents would
create a chilling effect has inherent appeal, whether this is the real
concern to doctors is questionable. If access were the driving
force, an equally compelling argument would exist for access in all
contexts; however, patented drugs have not received the same ve-
hement objections as have medical procedure patents."4
This disparity may be because doctors are only "restricted" in the
procedure context; in other contexts, patients, rather than doctors,
are restricted. Doctors may "believe" that they enjoy free access to
patented inventions other than medical procedures, such as medi-
cal apparati because they have not been threatened with infringe-
ment of such apparati. However, while it is true that doctors are
generally not liable for using patented products,'" access to the
patented item is not truly free because the patent is incorporated
into the purchase price.IG Thus, their core objection is not re-
stricted access to necessary procedures - an argument that may be
arguably unique to the medical profession - but rather the poten-
tial for doctors to be financially liable. This explains why doctors
have objected to paying even minimal royalties for medical proce-
alternative, the patent itself is still a neutral device, and regulation of the doctor, rather
than the patent would seem more appropriate.
"C See general/y AMA REPORT, supra note 13, at 62-63 (discussing restricted access to
patented procedures, but not mentioning restricted access to patented drugs as issue);
McCoy, supra note 132, at 510-11 (noting that denied access is pervasive in context of
modem medical care).
'" The person that buys a patented item from an authorized user is not considered to
be infringing the patent. Therefore, if a manufacturer of a patented medical device pays
the patent owner a fee for making the device, the doctor who buys the device from the
manufacturer is not liable to the patent owner since the patent right has been exhausted
with the manufacturer. However, this only applies to products, rather than processes.
Thus, doctors are generally vulnerable to suits for medical procedure patents, but not for
medical device and drug patents since they buy those products from others who have paid
the patentee for the privilege of using the patented technology. See, e.g., 5 CHISUM, supra
note 52, § 16.03[2] [a].
'" This distinction has been acknowledged by the AMA. See AMA REPORT, supra note
13, at 63; AMA, Ethical Issues, supra note 56, at 345 ("The chilling effect of procedural
patents distinguishes these patents in an important way from drug or device patents...
the physician does not have to worry about inadvertently infringing a drug or device
patent.... ."); see also Congressional Hearings on H.R 1127 and H.R 2419, supra note 13, at
81 (statement of Donald Dunner) (noting that physicians are usually indemnified from
patent infringement liability because "the makers of medical devices typically warrant,
either expressly or by legal implication, that use of the device will not infringe another's
patent right").
632
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dure patents, including those that result in an overall cost sav-
ings. 
4
Personal liability, however, arises from the use of all patented
processes, regardless of the field of technology. Accordingly, the
AMA argument assumes that doctors should be subject to a differ-
ent liability standard than all other classes of users. Doctors have
alleged that their situation is unique because medical emergencies
make determining patent liability unduly burdensome. 47 However,
medical emergencies do not necessarily justify different liability
standards because patent infringement need not be determined
only during an emergency. Rather, doctors may determine liability
in advance of any potential infringement, which is common in
other industries, by regularly reviewing patents. ' "
4. Patient Confidentiality
Doctors have also argued that medical procedure patents inher-
ently compromise patient privacy if patent owners monitor activity
to find infringement'" For example, determining whether a pat-
ented process has been used could involve the monitoring of pro-
cedures in an operating room by a video camera. Or, monitoring
could involve disclosure of patient medical files to indicate whether
a patented procedure had been performed. In either of these sce-
narios, a patient potentially could be identified and confidentiality
compromised.
But enforcing medical procedure patents need not compromise
patient confidentiality. Even the AMA acknowledges that "[i] t may
be possible to conduct enforcement in such a way as to be both
For example, in the Pallin case doctors protested strenuously even though the cost
in that case was relatively low - even accounting for the licensing fee, there was still a net
cost savings of about 12 dollars per surgery. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
However, it should be noted that the restricted access argument in the Pallin case may
have been bolstered by the strong belief that the Pallin patent was invalid. Thus, doctors
thought it improper to pay any amount of money for access to what was believed to be a
method long in the public domain.
"' See, e.g., Congressional Heaings on H.R. 1127 and H.R. 2419, supra note 13, at 44-46
(statement of Dr. Singer) (alleging that it would be unduly burdensome to determine if
patents existed before performing new or modified procedures).
" If, however, doctors or anyone else elect not to take such preventative measures, a
judicially determined "cost" after infringement will be substantially higher than one nego-
tiated prior to infringement - especially when the costs of litigation are accounted for.
" See, e.g., AMA REPORT, supra note 13, at 65; Annas, supra note 74, at 26;Jeffrey A.
Taylor, Comment, Medical P1cess Patents and Patient Privaty Rights, 14 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER& INFO. L. 131, 140-45 (1995).
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effective and confidential" by charging doctors based on the num-
ber of patients seen, rather than on a case-by-case basis.'" In addi-
tion, even if a royalty is not charged on a per patient basis, other
procedures could maintain patient confidentiality. For example,
identifying information in patient files may be redacted, or corn-
plete patient files could be available for review only in camera.151
These techniques are already standard procedures in civil litigation
where patient files are disclosed."" Similarly, situations outside of
the litigation context have protected patient confidentiality by re-
dacting personal information.
1
,
III. THE IMMUNITY PROVISION
Section 287(c) of the Patent Act provides "medical practitioners"
and "related health care entities" with immunity from patent in-
fringement suits concerning patents on "medical activity." '5 Be-
AMA REPORT, supra note 13, at 65; see also Edward Felsenthal, Medical Patents Trg-
gerDebate Among Doctors, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 1994, at BI (suggesting similar limitation to
reduce confidentiality issues). However, after acknowledging such a possibility, the AMA
immediately dismisses it in the same breath on the basis that it is unclear how this might
be accurately done, presumably based on the assumption that doctors would not accu-
rately report usage. See, e.g., AMA, Ethical Issues, supra note 56, at 347-48 (acknowledging
that "[i]t may be possible to conduct enforcement in such a way as to be both effective
and confidential," but maintaining that patient confidentiality will be nonetheless com-
promised because it is unclear "how to ensure accuracy of reporting... without compro-
mising confidentiality in some manner") (emphasis added).
"' See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 149, at 147-48 (suggesting information identifying pa-
tient should be redacted or judge should perform in camera inspection of patient's file).
"' See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c) (describing protective orders for disclosure of confi-
dential information).
'" Such situations include disclosures required by the Freedom of Information Act,
state and federal reimbursement regulations, and review by peer review organizations.
See, e.g., Garris, supra note 57, at 99-100 (describing how patient information has been
protected in other circumstances).
35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (1) (Supp. 111996). The full text of section 287(c) states:
(1) With respect to a medical practitioner's performance of a medical ac-
tivity that constitutes an infringement under section 271 (a) or (b) of
this tide, the provisions of sections 281, 283, 284, and 285 of this title
shall not apply against the medical practitioner or against a related
health care entity with respect to such medical activity.
(2) For the purposes of this subsection:
(A) the term "medical activity" means the performance of a medical or
surgical procedure on a body, but shall not include
(i) the use of a patented machine, manufacture, or com-
position of matter in violation of such patent,
(ii) the practice of a patented use of a composition of mat-
ter in violation of such patent, or
634
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cause the immunity extends to damages, injunctions, and attorney
fees, medical practitioners are immune from all the effects of in-
fringing a medical procedure patent."" The immunity, however,
(iii) the practice of a process in violation of a biotechnol-
ogy patent.
(B) the term "medical practitioner" means any natural person who is li-
censed by a State to provide the medical activity described in subsec-
tion (c) (1) or who is acting under the direction of such person in the
performance of the medical activity.
(C) the term "related health care entity" shall mean an entity with which a
medical practitioner has a professional affiliation under which the
medical practitioner performs the medical activity, including but not
limited to a nursing home, hospital, university, medical school, health
maintenance organization, group medical practice, or a medical
clinic.
(D) the term "professional affiliation" shall mean staff privileges, medical
staff membership, employment or contractual relationship, partner-
ship or ownership interest, academic appointment, or other affilia-
tion under which a medical practitioner provides the medical activity
on behalf of, or in association with, the health care entity.
(E) the term "body" shall mean a human body, organ or cadaver, or a
nonhuman animal used in medical research or instruction directly re-
lating to the treatment of humans.
(F) the term "patented use of a composition of matter" does not include
a claim for a method of performing a medical or surgical procedure
on a body that recites the use of a composition of matter where the
use of that composition of matter does not directly contribute to
achievement of the objective of the claimed method.
(G) the term "State" shall mean any state or territory of the United States,
the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
(3) This subsection does not apply to the activities of any person, or em-
ployee or agent of such person (regardless of whether such person is
a tax exempt organization under section 501(c) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code), who is engaged in the commercial development, manufac-
ture, sale, importation, or distribution of a machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter or the provision of pharmacy or clinical labo-
ratory services (other than clinical laboratory services provided in a
physician's office), where such activities are:
(A) directly related to the commercial development, manufacture, sale,
importation, or distribution of a machine, manufacture, or composi-
tion of matter or the provision of pharmacy or clinical laboratory ser-
vices (other than clinical laboratory services provided in a physician's
office), and
(B) regulated under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the Pub-
lic Health Service Act, or the Clinical Laboratories Improvement Act.
(4) This subsection shall not apply to any patent issued before the date of
enactment of this subsection.
d.
See 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1994) (stating that patentee "shall have remedy by civil action
for infringement of his patent"); id. § 283 (1994) (providing courts power to grant injunc-
tions for violations of patents); id. § 284 (1994) (requiring courts to award damages of at
least reasonable royalty upon finding of patent infringement); i& § 285 (1994) (providing
for attorney fees in "exceptional cases").
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only applies to the performance of a "medical activity," which is
subject to further definitions and exceptions."
Although not explicitly stated, section 287(c) effectively operates
as a compulsory licensing provision because it gives doctors a de
facto license to use certain patented processes without the patent
owner's consent. This compulsory license is forced upon patent
owners regardless of the invention or the owner's intent to license.
A. Who Is Entitled to Immunity
There are two classes of persons to whom section 287(c) applies:
medical practitioners and their related entities. A "medical practi-
tioner" includes physicians and those who serve in a related capac-
ity of treating patients. In particular, it includes a person "licensed
by a State" to provide a "medical activity" or that is "acting under
the direction" of someone that is licensed.57 A medical practitio-
ner could thus be a doctor or any other type of health care pro-
vider licensed by a state, such as a nurse, dentist, or physical thera-
pist. s  In addition, the definition includes an entity with which the
See iU § 287(c) (2) (defining "medical activity").
Id. § 287(c) (2) (B). Depending on the definition of "acting under the direction
of," patients may not be provided immunity for acts that their doctors have immunity for.
Patients may be vulnerable to patent infringement suits if they performed a "medical
activity," although their doctor could perform the same activity with immunity because
doctors are explicitly covered by this section. See i& For example, if a patent claims a
method of treating a scalp to encourage new hair growth (i.e., a method of treating bald-
ness), a patient performing the method in his home would be liable. However, if the
patient had his doctor perform the method instead, neither the patient nor doctor would
be liable, assuming that none of the 287(c) exceptions applied. This liability may be
theoretical at this point because patients are typically not sued for patent infringement;
however, the same was previously true for doctors. See supra note 10 and accompanying
text. In addition, it could be inferred that Congress decided against providing immunity
to patients since earlier legislative proposals concerning medical procedure patents in-
cluded patients as a class of persons to be protected from patent infringement in contrast
to section 287(c). See S. 1334, 104th Cong. § 2 (1995) ("[lIt shall not be an act of in-
fringement for a patient, physician, or other licensed health care practitioner... to use
or induce others to use a patented [medical procedure] . .. ."). However, given the hasty
enactment of section 287(c), the omission of patients from the scope of immunity could
also have been an oversight. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (noting lack of
debate prior to enactment of § 287(c)).
" Also, those who work for medical practitioners are covered, although for the pur-
poses of this paper "medical practitioner" will be used to refer to all these persons. How-
ever, because of the narrow definition of a qualifying "medical activity," not all persons
who constitute "medical practitioners" will actually be entitled to immunity. For example,
although both doctors and veterinarians qualify under the definition of a "medical practi-
tioner," the requirement that the "medical activity" must be performed on a "body" ends
up excluding veterinarians. In particular, animal bodies are only included within the
636
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medical practitioner has a "professional affliation""" and under
which the medical practitioner conducts the activity in question.'6
Examples of such an entity include a hospital, university, medical
school, and even a health maintenance organization ("HMO").
61
B. Parameters of the Immunity
The primary problem in determining what activity will give rise
to the royalty-free license under section 287(c) involves interpret-
ing the critical phrase, "medical or surgical procedure." 6  The
statute obliquely defines this term in the negative, by providing
three activities that do not constitute a medical or surgical proce-
dure.'63 In particular, the statute states that the term shall not in-
clude:
(i) the use of a patented machine, manufacture or composition
of matter in violation of such patent;
definition of a "body" if used in medical research or instruction "directly relating" to the
treatment of humans. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2) (E). Treatment of an animal purely for
the sake of alleviating an animal's medical condition would not be within the definition of
this section. Therefore, a doctor performing a patented surgical technique on a human
heart would be performing a procedure on a "body," and immune from liability. In con-
trast, a veterinarian performing the same patented surgical technique on a dog would
not.
. A "professional affiliation" goes beyond employment, to include staff privileges,
contractual relationship, academic appointment and any other affiliation under which a
medical practitioner provides the medical activity "on behalf of, or in association with, the
health care entity." Id. § 287(c) (2) (D).
" Seeid. § 287(c)(2)(C).
,'See id.
Another interpretive problem with section 287(c) is that it covers "performance of
a medical or surgical procedure on a body" and defines "body" so broadly that it is not
fully supported by prior policy arguments advanced by the AMA. See id. § 287(c)(2)(A).
For example, a "body" is defined to include not only a live human body such as a patient,
but also a "cadaver, or a nonhuman animal used in medical research or instruction di-
rectly relating to the treatment of humans." Ild. § 287(c)(2)(E). However, the issues
regarding confidentiality and compromised patient care clearly do not exist with respect
to cadavers, and are probably not a major issue regarding research animals.
36 See i. § 287 (c) (2) (A). Section 287(c) (2) (A) provides:
[T]he term "medical activity" means the performance of a medical or sur-
gical procedure on a body, but shall not include (i) the use of a patented
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter in violation of such pat-
ent, (ii) the practice of a patented use of a composition of matter in viola-
tion of such patent, or (iii) the practice of a process in violation of a bio-
technology patent.
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(ii) the practice of a patented use of a composition of matter in
violation of such patent, or
(iii) the practice of a process in violation of a biotechnology pat-
ent.
These three exceptions are taken in turn below'6
1. A Doctor's Use of a Patented Product
Under the first exception, a medical practitioner is not provided
any immunity for the "use of a patented machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter in violation of such patent."66 The "use"
referred to here is that of a patented product, such as a medical
apparatus.' 7 The exception also embraces patents that claim both
a product and a process. u A doctor that purchases a patented ap-
paratus, however, is typically not liable for using that apparatus
because there is an implied license to use the patented product as
long as the product is purchased from a licensed manufacturer.'
Accordingly, a doctor that uses a patented product will be liable
only if the product is purchased from a vendor that is not author-
ized to make or sell the product.
'u Id.
' Each of these exceptions refer to "the violation of a patent," which implicitly refers
to patent claims. Claims are the sentences at the end of a patent that define the scope of
the patentee's exclusive rights. See id. § 112 (1994) (noting that patents "shall conclude
with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject
matter which the applicant regards as his invention'); Smithkline Diagnostics, Inc. v.
Helena Labs. Corp., 859 F.2d 878, 882-85 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Constant v. Advanced Micro
Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1567-69 (Fed. Cir. 1988). A patentee has the right to ex-
clude others from making, using, selling, or importing the invention as claimed. See 35
U.S.C. § 271 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (prohibiting activities regarding patented inven-
tion). Anyone who performs any of these activities with regard to the claimed invention is
typically liable to the patent owner for patent infringement. See iU; id. § 281 (1994); see
also infra notes 204-06 and accompanying text (discussing limited exceptions to infringe-
ment).
35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(2)(A)(i).
10 Although the patent statute refers to four categories of subject matter - ma-
chines, manufactures, composition of matter and processes, the claims referring to these
categories are denoted as product claims and process claims. Process claims include
claims that describe a process or method of doing something, including a use of a previ-
ously known product. See id. § 100 (1994). All other claims refer to products; examples of
product claims include claims that describe a tangible product such as a machine, drug,
or chemical composition.
'" The violation referred to here is probably patent "infringement" because the pat-
ent right to exclusivity is violated. See supra notes 1, 4 and accompanying text.
"' SeeJoy Technologies v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 773-74 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (observing
infringement of method claims when steps of claimed method are performed).
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2. A Doctor's Use of a Patented Composition of Matter
The second exception preserves patent liability for "the practice
of a patented use of a composition of matter."7" Unlike the first
exception, this one refers to a patented process.' Typically, the
phrase "patented use of a composition of matter" refers to a patent
on the use of an unpatentable composition. In other words, al-
though the composition itself is unpatentable, the use of the com-
position is patented.'7 For example, despite a preexisting patent
on a composition to cure acne, the use of that comosition to treat
wrinkles was later given separate patent protection.
The precise scope of this exception is difficult to ascertain be-
cause it is further limited by the requirement that it not include "a
claim for a method of performing a medical or surgical procedure
on a body that recites the use of a composition of matter where the
use of that composition of matter does not directly contribute to [the]
achievement of the objective of the claimed method" 74 The Confer-
ence Report attempts to clarify when a patented use will "directly
contribute" and how to determine the "objective of the claimed
invention";'7 5 however, the definitions may be difficult to apply be-
cause they depend on what appears in each undefined step of the
patent claim and on issues that were not important to determining
patentability. In particular, the definitions hinge on whether each
step of the claim recites the use of a composition of matter that "is
itself novel or if it... is necessary to establish the nonobviousness
'" Se35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(2)(A)(ii).
The terms "process," "use," and "method" are interchangeable, distinct only from a
product. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
' See 35 U.S.C. § 100(b). A patented "new use" of a composition of matter refers to a
patent on the use of a composition of matter. A common composition of matter in such a
case would be a chemical composition such as a drug. Generally, patents are only sought
on the use of a composition when the composition itself is not patentable. This may
occur when the composition is in the public domain either because it was not patented in
a timely manner, or because the patent has now expired.
'" See U.S. Patent No. 4,603,146 (July 29, 1986) ('Methods for Retarding the Effects
of Aging of the Skin"); Edmund L. Andrews, Patents: Uniersity Sues Inventor of Retin-A, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 27, 1990, at 37; see also Edmund L. Andrews, Patents: Spaghetti and Meatballs
From a Fat Substitute N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1988, at 36 (noting issuance of patent on new
uses of olestra although compound has been already patented); Edmund L. Andrews,
Patents: UlcerDrugs May Help Mentaly ll, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1991, at 34 (noting issuance
of patent on new use of Zantac, formerly used as ulcer medication, in treatment of
schizophrenia).
35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(2)(F) (emphasis added).
" Segeneraly id. § 287(c) (failing to provide definitions for these terms).
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of the claim as a whole."1 7 Patentability, however, depends on the
claims as a whole rather than on their ambiguous steps.'"
3. A Doctor's Use of a Patented Biotechnology Process
The third exception to the definition of medical activity giving
rise to immunity is "the practice of a process in violation of a bio-
technology patent."'" Although section 287(c) does not directly
define the term "biotechnology patent,"79 the Conference Report
states that the term includes: "a patent on a 'biotechnological
process' as defined in 35 U.S.C. § 103(b),' 80 [and] a patent on a
" 142 CONG. REC. HI 1,865 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1996). Where each such "step" recites
a use the House Report asserts that the composition will "necessarily contribute to the
novelty - and therefore, to the objective - of the claimed method." Id However, for
claims that do not recite a use in each step, a more complex test applies, which will be
referred to as the hybrid test. Under this test, the "objective" of the claimed method must
first be determined, taking into account all of the steps set forth in the claim. See id.
Second, it must be determined whether the steps involving the use of composition of
matter "contribute directly" to the achievement of the objective of the claimed invention.
See id. The second part is deemed to have been met if the use of the composition of mat-
ter represents novel subject matter, or if one or more of the steps contributes to or is
necessary to establish the nonobviousness of the claim as a whole. See id. In addition, it
has been suggested that clever drafting of claims may avoid the more difficult hybrid test.
See, e.g., Randall B. Bateman & M. Wayne Western, Medical Procedure Patents, the 1996
Amendment And Wo is Really Liable, IP TODAY, Dec. 1997, at 6.
' These tests require determining the novelty of individual steps of claims even
though such "steps" need not be deemed novel for the claims to issue in a valid patent.
See, eg., In 7e Burke, Inc., 786 F. Supp. 1537, 1539 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (noting that combina-
tion of elements may be novel even though individual elements are not); see also Hock-
erson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. Converse Inc., 183 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (noting that
in context of claim construction, entire claim must be reviewed, rather than examining
isolated elements).
35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(2)(A)(iii).
Seegenerallid.§287(c).
Id. § 103(b)(3) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Section 103(b)(3) defines a biotechno-
logical process as:
(A) a process of genetically altering or otherwise inducing a single- or
multi-celled organism to -
(i) express an exogenous nucleotide sequence,
(ii) inhibit, eliminate, augment, or alter expression of an
endogenous nucleotide sequence, or
(iii) express a specific physiological characteristic not natu-
rally associated with said organism;
(B) cell fusion procedures yielding a cell line that expresses a specific
protein, such as a monoclonal antibody; and
(C) a method of using a product produced by a process defined by sub-
paragraph (A) or (B), or a combination of subparagraphs (A) and
(B).
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process of making or using biological materials, including treat-
ment using those materials where [they] have been manipulated
ex vivo at the cellular or molecular level." "' This exception carves
a substantial hole in the immunity provision. Given the potential
expansion of gene therapy,'" a substantial number of physicians
would remain fully liable for patent infringement that occurred
during the practice of medicine.
C. Limitations of the Immunity
Although section 287(c) provides doctors with some immunity,
that immunity is fairly narrow so that the prior argument concern-
ing negative impacts on medical norms still exists. In particular,
the section only clearly provides immunity against pure process
patents - those that do not involve a patented apparatus, compo-
sition of matter, or biotechnological process.18 Aside from this
limited protection, doctors have the same liability they did before
section 287(c) was enacted. In addition, the immunity provision
may give rise to additional litigation to determine its scope.1
The only benefit that doctors obtain under section 287(c) is im-
munity from infringement of patented procedures that do not in-
volve either a patented use of a composition of matter or genetic
manipulation! An example of a patented procedure that would
satisfy all of these requirements would be Pallin's patent's because
142 CONG. REC. Hi1,866 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1996).See, e.g., Todd Ackerman, Center to Offer Cell-and-Gene Therapy: New Treatment Option
Expected to Become the Future of Medicine, Hous. CHRON.,July 27, 1999, at Al (noting estab-
lishment of gene therapy center and expectation that this treatment option is future of
medicine); Shulman, supra note 138, at 44 (noting that NIH has patented ex vivo gene
therapy method to treat genetic disorder).
For example, gene therapy has been used to insert extra genes into the heart to
enable patients to grow their own bypasses in cases where patients have clogged vessels
but cannot undergo traditional bypass surgery or angioplasty. See Injected Genes Help Grow
Heart Bypasses, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 1998, at A3; see aso Ron Kotulak, Glimmer of Hope in
Gene Therapy, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 28, 1999, at C1 (reporting that gene therapy holds glimmer
of hope for breakthrough in genetically linked diseases and inherited conditions); Mi-
chael LaSalandra, Prostrate Cancer Patients Band Together For Support, BOSTON HERALD, May
18, 1999, at 2 (noting that gene therapy is looking promising).
See supra notes 166-82 and accompanying text.
See in fta notes 19598 and accompanying text.
' See supra notes 162-82 and accompanying text.
' See U.S. Patent No. 5,080,111 Ua-n. 14, 1992) ("Method of Making Self-Sealing
Episcleral Incision").
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it claimed a method of suturing without stitches but did not use a
composition of matter or any genetic manipulation.'87
The immunity's scope is further narrowed because section
287(c) is not retroactive; therefore, owners of patents issued before
the law's enactment retain their full panoply of remedies against
doctors.' "  Accordingly, patents issued before 1996 remain en-
forceable against doctors, assuming they are valid. " Because of
the term of these patents, doctors will remain subject to patent
infringement suits for more than ten years after the passage of the
supposed remedy' 90 Although some have proposed broadening
section 287(c) to make it retroactive,'9' that would fail to address
the other domestic and international policy problems that section
287(c) creates.'9 Therefore, aside from pure process patents is-
,s See, e.g., Congremsional Hearings on H.R. 1127 and H.R 2419, supra note 13, at 58
(statement of Charles Kelman, President, American Society of Cataract and Refractive
Surgery) (clarifying that opposition is only to "pure medical procedures" but not patented
methods of using drugs, medical devices or biological products or processes that are
subject to FDA development); see id at 69 (statement of Dr. Dunbar Hoskins, Vice Presi-
dent, American Academy of Ophthalmology) (opposing patenting of medical procedures,
but not devices). Doctors were not opposed to patents that covered both a medical appa-
ratus and a medical procedure. See id.; see also AMA REPORT, supra note 13, at 60 (exclud-
ing "medical process patents which involve the patenting of a procedure in conjunction
with a device or drug... [as well as] patents for devices without which a procedure can-
not be performed" because they do not constitute type of "pure medical process patents"
that AMA finds objectionable).
'- See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (4) (Supp. 11 1996) ("This subsection shall not apply to any
patent issued before the date of enactment of this subsection."); Kurt Eichenwald, Push for
Royalties Threatens Use of Down Syndrome Test, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1997, at Al; Brenda
Sandburg, Kaiser Case is Dismissed, Triple Marker Patent Stands, RECORDER, Nov. 20, 1998, at
1.
I In addition, due to recent legislation, the scope of section 287(c) immunity is
further limited. In particular, section 287(c) has been revised to expressly prevent appli-
cations of immunity to patents based on applications filed before date of enactment -
regardless of when the patent issued.
See 35 U.S.C. § 156 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
For example, Representative Ganske, who played a pivotal role in the enactment of
section 287(c), has suggested that eliminating the retroactivity component might be
necessary. See, e.g., Eichenwald, supra note 188, at Al; Shulman, supra note 138, at 45.
'" In addition, such an action may raise constitutional concerns with respect to taking
of property. See, e.g., Courtenay C. Brinckerhoff, Medical Method Patents and the Fifth
Amendment: Do the New Limits on Enforceability Effect a Taking 4 U. BALT. INTELI- PROP. LJ.
147, 165-177 (1996); see also Thomas Cotter, Do Federal Uses of Intellectual Prpet Implicate
the 5th Amendment? 50 FLA. L. REv. 529, 530-33 (1998). However, potential constitutional
consequences may not need to be tackled since most recent activity in Congress on this
issue has suggested narrowing, rather than broadening the scope of section 287(c). SeeS.
REP. No. 42, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. 113 (1997) (proposing to amend section 287(c) "to
narrow the scope of the ban on enforcement of medical methods patents so as to exempt
those patents for which an application was pending on the date of enactment of the
642
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sued after 1996, all other patented procedures may subject doctors
to full liability for patent infringement.
In addition, because section 287(c) does not provide equal im-
munity from all patented processes, doctors remain restricted from
using certain medical procedures. For example, a doctor that
wants to use a patented gene therapy method on a fetus to elimi-
nate a genetic defect cannot do so without the consent of the pat-
ent owner because the patented method would constitute a
method covered by a "biotechnology patent" - one of the excep-
tions to immunity under section 287(c) . However, if the same
doctor performs fetal surgery to cure a physical defect without the
use of any genetic manipulations, patent liability would not at-
tach.' %
Moreover, determining which medical procedures fall within
section 287(c) will likely require litigation.'95 Congress assumed
that courts could determine whether this exception is met early in
litigation through a motion to dismiss or summary judgment."
ban"); see also Legislation: Judiciary Committee Approves Bill to Reorganize PTO, Amend Patent
Law, 54 BNA's PAT. TRADEMARK& COPYRIGHTJ. 83 (1997).
See supra notes 178-82 and accompanying text.
This assumes, of course, that the patented equipment was purchased from an
unlicensed vendor.
'" Indeed, the ABA section on Intellectual Property has argued that "the number of
suits may increase inasmuch as the uncertainty of the outcome will prevent parties from
predicting the results of litigation in advance." Annual Report 1996-1997, 70 A.B.A. SEC.
I.P. LAw REP. 103 (1997); see also Charles Craig, Biotech Backers Fear Medical Patent Ban Will
Hurt Industr, BIowORLD TODAY, July 26, 1996 (quoting Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America as saying that "'[m]odifying any statute as complex as the U.S.
patent code on an issue as fundamental as the scope of patentability' will create uncer-
tainty and result in more litigation").
'" In an attempt to expedite such early resolutions, the House Report provides new
standards for determining when either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary
judgment should be granted on this issue. The House Report states that dismissal of an
infringement action would be appropriate if it was shown that (1) there is clear and con-
vincing evidence that the use(s) of the composition(s) of matter lack novelty, and (2)
under a preponderance of evidence standard, the steps of the claimed method that do
not involve uses of compositions of matter (i.e., the medical procedure steps) are them-
selves novel and nonobvious. See 142 CONG. REC. H1l,866 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1996).
However, the proposed standards of proof will not expedite the disposal of this issue
because the new standards do not supersede the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A
later-enacted Congressional statute would be controlling if there were a conflict between
the Congressional statute and an earlier and inconsistent rule under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. See, e.g., United States v. Gustin-Bacon Div., Certainteed Prods. Corp.,
426 F.2d 539, 542 (10th Cir. 1970) (noting that Congress may statutorily supersede Fed-
eral Rules, but unless there is clear congressional intent to do so, subsequently enacted
statutes should be construed to harmonize with Federal Rules); Burlington N. v. Consoli-
dated Fibers, Inc., 7 F. Supp. 2d 822, 826 (N.D. Tex. 1998) (noting that subsequent con-
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But determining whether section 287(c) applies involves fact-
intensive inquiries, including an analysis of novelty and nonobvi-
ousness. 7 Moreover, because section 287(c) immunity depends
on a new method of interpreting a patent's claims that will inher-
ently require consultation of materials outside the patent itself, the
usual presumption that claims may be construed on summary
judgment motions is inapplicable.'"
Because a doctor that is sued for patent infringement may not
know whether section 287(c) immunity applies until trial,'" the
gressional statute can supersede Federal Rules if there is clear congressional intent to do
so). However, in this case, the federal statute - section 287(c) - is not in conflict with
the Federal Rules. Rather, the "conflict" is between the standard set forth in the legisla-
tive history and the standard in the Federal Rules.
'" See, e.g., supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text (discussing requirements to
determine whether § 287(c) immunity applies). For example, determining nonobvious-
ness is only possible after factual determinations that include determination of the scope
of the prior art, the level of skill in the prior art, and additional considerations such as the
commercial success due to the patented invention. See, e.g., Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal
Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
'" It should also be noted that although ajudge may interpret the meaning of claims
as a matter of law in patent infringement cases by examining an essentially integrated
document - the patent and its "prosecution history" (the paper history documenting
correspondence between patent applicant and the PTO prior to the issuance of a patent),
no such document would contain the information necessary to apply these tests. See, e.g.,
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 389-90 (1996) (stating that patent is
fully integrated instrument), aftg52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995). For example, the novelty
and nonobviousness of a method of use is based on the claim as a whole, whereas section
287(c) examines individual components of claims. Because there is no statutory require-
ment that these individual components be independently patentable, it is unlikely that
the prosecution history will be revealing. See supra note 177 and accompanying text (ex-
plaining that patentability is based on patent claims, not individual components).
Although the wording of claims may play a role in determining liability in other
contexts, section 287(c) uses new tests for interpretation of claims that may create uncer-
tainty in liability. Interpreting claims in the context of patent infringement typically does
not give special weight to words that are reiterated in the steps of a claim; rather, claims
are required to be interpreted in light of other items such as the rest of the patent. See
Vitrionics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582-83 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Amhil
Enters. Ltd. v. Wawa, Inc., 81 F.3d 1554, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Advance Transformer Co.
v. Levinson, 837 F.2d 1081, 1083 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In addition, other patent law doctrines
exist in the infringement context to prevent form from prevailing over function. For
example, the doctrine of equivalents allows a patent owner to establish infringement even
where a defendant's activities are not literally encompassed by the strict wording of the
claims. See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 25-26
(1997); Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.SA, Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1258 (Fed.
Cir. 1989); Texas Instruments Inc. v. United States ITC, 805 F.2d 1558, 1569-71 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
" One possible way this could be minimized is if the issue of immunity were bifur-
cated from the remainder of the action. See FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b). However, as experi-
ence with other bifurcated patent issues has shown, such decisions will be fact-based and
unlikely subject to uniform determination by district courts. Se, e.g., Scientific-Atlanta v.
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doctor may need to prepare a full defense, not just an argument
that the section 287(c) immunity applies. Even if a doctor were
ultimately found to be shielded from liability, he would nonethe-
less have had to bear high litigation costs typically involved in pat-
ent litigation.(*
The above description of the immunity provision highlights
some serious flaws in the precision of the statute. While many stat-
utes often suffer from imprecise language, the problems with sec-
tion 287(c) are particularly glaring because it was intended to
bring clarity and certainty to patent liability for physicians.2m ' In
addition, the immunity provision obstructs domestic patent law
policies and international obligations and policies, as the following
Part explains.
IV. IMPACTS ON DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
A. Domestic Patent Law and Policy
1. The Right to Exclude
As noted, the right to exclude is fundamental to domestic patent
policy.m Without the right to exclude, the "express purpose of the
General Instrument, 24 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 1239, 1241-42 (D. Md. 1993) (grant-
ing motion to bifurcate liability from damages and willfulness); Haney v. Timesavers Inc.,
26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1159, 1160 (D. Or. 1992) (granting motion to bifurcate liability and dam-
ages, but not bifurcating willfulness); Air-Shields Inc. v. BOC Group, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d 1955,
1956-58 (D. Md. 1992) (granting motion to bifurcate liability from damages and willful-
ness); see also United States Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co., No. 89 C 7533 1994 WL
74989, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 10, 1994) (trifurcating trial into patent liability and dam-
ages, willfulness, and then antitrust phases on plaintiff's motion to bifurcate patent in-
fringement from antitrust counterclaims).
See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. H8276 (daily ed. July 24, 1996) (statement of Rep. Gan-
ske) (noting costs of defending Singer was on order of one-half million dollars prior to
consent decree); John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of
Litigad Patents, 26 AM. INTELL PROP. L. ASS'N Q.J. 185, 187 (1998) (noting that litigation
costs often exceed one million dollars per party). Although this may be true in other
patented areas as well, the inconsistency here defeats the primary objective of the AMA in
shielding all doctors from patent liability. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
Although some doctors will be immune under section 287(c), most doctors will suffer
from the same uncertainty of litigation that they protested against prior to the enactment
of section 287(c). See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 142.
See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
' See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (noting that right
to exclude is "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly
characterized as property");Joy Tech., Inc. v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 772 (Fed. Cir. 1993);
In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("[t]he patent right is a right to exclude");
Connell v. Sears, 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (noting that patent act states that
patent is form of property and that right to exclude is essence of concept of property); see
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Constitution and Congress, to promote the progress of the useful
arts, would be seriously undermined."20 Accordingly, both Con-
gress and courts have vigorously protected this right by limiting
exceptions to patent infringement," including limiting the avail-
ability of compulsory licenses." Although compulsory licensing
usually provides patent owners with some compensation, compul-
sory licenses are inconsistent with the exclusionary right and are
therefore disfavored.m Accordingly, although injunctive relief for
patent owners that prevail in infringement actions is discretionary,
courts are inclined to grant an injunction to avoid a de facto com-
pulsory license." Courts deny permanent injunctive relief to pre-
also 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (identifying what constitutes patent in-
fringement).
Smith v. Hughes Tool, 718 F.2d 1573, 1577-78 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
The Patent Act only provides a single statutory exception to infringement. See 35
U.S.C. § 271 (e) (1); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 872 F.2d 402, 404 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
(noting that objective of 271(e) (1) was to allow generic drugs for patented drug to be
available immediately after patent expired), afj'd, 496 U.S. 661 (1990). In addition, even
this exception was controversial when enacted and justified as a measure to prevent a
patent owner from obtaining a longer period of protection, rather than concern for the
infringer. See, e.g., Alfred B. Engelberg, SpecialPatent Provisions for Pharmaceuticals: Have
They Outlived Their Usefulness, 39 IDEA 389, 398-99 (1999) (detailing arduous path to
enactment of § 271 (e)); Ajay S. Pathak, The Effect of Lilly v. Medtronics on the Scope of 35
U. S.C. § 271 (e)(1): The Patent Infringement Exemption - Broad or Narrow, 6 J.L. & HEALTH
175, 183-85 (1991) (noting that this provision was added to bill to extend patent term in
cases of administrative delay to accommodate generic drug manufacturers who otherwise
would have had nothing to gain). Similarly, courts have created few exceptions to tradi-
tional infringement. There are only two very limited exceptions - one for de minimis
use, and another vaguely formulated and rarely successful exception for experimental
use. The Federal Circuit has in fact called the defense "truly narrow." Roche Prods. Inc.
v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see also Eisenberg, Proprietary
Rights, supra note 56, at 217-26 (discussing scope and purpose of experimental use de-
fense).
" See Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980) (noting that
"[c]ompulsory licensing is a rarity in our patent system").
Although common in other countries, the United States has never endorsed com-
pulsory licensing for failure to use an invention and has in fact lobbied strenuously to
remove such provisions on a global level. Canada and Mexico were forced to repeal com-
pulsory licensing requirements for drug patents in order for the United States to agree to
NAFTA. Similarly, articles 27 and 31 of TRIPS are the result of efforts to limit compulsory
licensing world-wide based on failure to work. See infra Part IV.B; cf. infra note 306 (not-
ing experimental use defense as one of exceptions to infringement proposed by other
countries in context of negotiating TRIPS); see alsoJohn Giust, Comparative Analysis of the
United States Patent Law and the New Industrial Property Code of Brazil 21 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMp. L. REv. 597, 618-19 (1998) (noting substantial exceptions to infringement under
Brazilian patent act in comparison with U.S. patent act).
Although the Patent Act does not mandate injunctive relief, it is generally granted
once there has been a judgment of patent infringement. See, e.g., Richardson v. Suzuki
Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("It is the general rule that an injunction
646
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vailing patent owners only in the rare instance in which an injunc-
tion would cause immediate danger to public health.2"
Similarly, Congress has provided for very few statutorily imposed
compulsory licenses and has restricted the scope of those licenses.
In cases where Congress has previously allowed compulsory licens-
ing of patents, it has not imposed those licenses without first giving
patent owners the ability to obtain a voluntary license or compen-
sation for any compulsory license." 9 For example, under the Clean
Air Act ("CAA"), if a patent owner must license the patented inven-
tion because the CAA mandated use of the patented technology,
the owner first has the option to license the patent and dictate the
terms.2' * Only if the voluntary negotiation fails is a mandatory roy-
alty forced upon the owner,"' and even in these instances, the
will issue when infringement has been adjudged, absent a sound reason for denying it.");
KSM Fastening Sys., Inc. v. HA Jones Co., 776 F.2d 1522, 1524 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
' See Continental Paper Bag v. Eastern Paper Bag,. 210 U.S. 405, 424-30 (1908) (de-
nying injunctive relief to patentee of medical test kits because of overriding public inter-
est); City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577, 593 (7th Cir. 1934) (deny-
ing permanent injunction against city operation of sewage disposal plant in light of public
health concerns); Vitamin Technologists, Inc. v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Found., 146
F.2d 941,946-47 (9th Cir. 1945).
In addition, courts often grant preliminary injunctions unless the public interest is
harmed. See, e.g., Hybritech, Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 849 F.2d 1446, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(affirming partial denial of injunction preliminarily enjoining sale of cancer test kits and
hepatitis kits because of public interest in continued availability of kits); Ethicon Endo-
Surgery v. United States Surgical Corp., 855 F. Supp. 1500, 1517 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (deny-
ing preliminary injunction where immediate withdrawal of devices would have "serious
disruptive effect on surgical practice").
One exception to the general rule that the patent owner is allowed freedom to
negotiate the amount of remuneration, is with use by the federal government. The
United States government is entitled to use any United States patent without consent of
the patent owner. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); see also 35 U.S.C. § 203
(1994) (allowing federal agency who funded invention to have right to use invention as
licensee under reasonable terms). The patent owner in such cases is not given an oppor-
tunity to negotiate a license, but the owner is still entitled to bring an action to recover
.reasonable and entire compensation" for the government's use. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a)
(1994). See generally RichardJ. McGrath, The Unauthorized Use of Patents by the United Stats
Government or Its Contractors, 18 AM. INTELL PROP. L. ASS'N QJ. 349 (1991) (providing
general discussion of recovery from United States government under § 1498 action).
Thus, patent owners can still control the amount that they should get in exchange for the
reduced exclusion right.
"*C See 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (1994); see also Plant Variety Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2404
(1994) (providing licenses where *necessary in order to insure an adequate supply of
fiber, food or feed... [if] the owner is unwilling or unable to supply the public needs ...
at a price which may reasonably be deemed fair" in area of plant variety protection, which
provides similar protection to patent system for plant varieties).
' See 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (allowing district court to requite patent owner to license on
reasonable terms and conditions).
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owner is provided a reasonable royalty as determined by a court.L2 '2
Similarly, the owner of a patent relating to material covered by the
Atomic Energy Act is entitled to a reasonable royalty, which the
Commission determines only after voluntary negotiation fails.
2
'
3
Section 287(c) is, thus, a distinct departure from patent policy
that assiduously protects the right to exclude. Further, section
287(c) requires compulsory licensing in situations that are unlike
other situations that justify such a license."4 In particular, section
287(c) does not alleviate immediate public harm, nor is it neces-
sary to prevent a patent owner from withholding critical goods.
Moreover, because the license mandated by section 287(c) does
not provide for any royalty to the patent holder, it is more onerous
than prior compulsory licensing provisions.
2. Impact on Innovation
The automatic compulsory licensing that section 287(c) man-
dates may have a substantial impact on innovation. Even those that
proposed compulsory licensing for medical procedures before sec-
tion 287(c) acknowledged that such a scheme might discourage
some inventions.2'5  They further acknowledged that reduced pat-
" See id. § 7608(2). Before a district court mandates licensing, the Attorney General
must first establish that compliance with the CAA requires use of a patented invention,
that there are no reasonable alternative methods, and that without such a license there
would be a substantial lessening of competition. See id. § 7608(1).
" See id. § 2183(g) (1994). If the Commission is establishing a reasonable royalty fee,
the Commission may take into account:
(A) the advice of the Patent Compensation Board;
(B) any defense ... that might be pleaded by a defendant in an action for
infringement;
(C) the extent to which, if any, such patent was developed through feder-
ally financed research; and
(D) the degree of utility, novelty, and importance of the invention or dis-
covery, and may consider the cost to the owner of the patent of de-
veloping such invention or discovery or acquiring such patent.
Id. § 2187(c)(1) (1994).
" See supra notes 210-13 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Gregory F. Burch, Note, Ethical Considerations in the Patenting of Medical
Processes, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1139, 1170-71 (1987) (noting that mandatory licensing may
discourage development of particularly costly or risky medical procedures but rationaliz-
ing that 'half a loaf is better than none" on assumption that only other solution for deal-
ing with medical community would be complete prohibition of patents). This criticism
echoes criticism of prior compulsory licensing schemes. SeeWilliam W. Beckett & Richard
M. Merriman, Will the Patent Provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 Promote Progress or
Stifle Invention?, 37J. PAT. OFF. SOC"' 38, 53-59 (1955) (discussing undesirability of com-
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ent protection could slow the rate at which inventions are discov-
ered."8 Nonetheless, they justified compulsory licensing as better
than complete denial of protection, which they presumed was the
only other alternative. 7 But this justification is inapplicable, as
section 287(c) fails to provide any compensation - unlike other
proposals! 8 and compulsory licensing statutes.".
The impact on innovation after section 287(c) could be deter-
mined by examining the number of medical procedure patents
before and after the enactment of this section;"0 however, this
would be a poor gauge, as numbers alone cannot measure lost in-
novation. In addition, if only one invention were not discovered
because of section 287(c), it nonetheless would be significant if
pulsory licensing and noting that compulsory licensing statute is dangerous precedent for
diluting patent system that has proven successful for United States); Dan L. Burk, Patent-
ing Tmnsgenic Human Embiyos: A Nonuse Cost Perspective, 30 HOuS. L REV. 1597, 1628
(1993) (criticizing *reasonable royalty" rate as illusory incentive); Warren F. Schwartz,
Mandatory Patent Licensing of Air Pollution Control Technology, 57 VA. L. REV. 719 (1971)
(criticizing compulsory licensing provision under CAA as questionable compromise of
affording compensation to inventors while securing ready access because of difficulties in
administration); Robert Weissman, A Long Strange TRIPS: The Pharmaceutical Industry Drive
to Harmonize Global Intellectual Property Rules, and the Remaining WFO Legal Alternatives
Available to Third World Countries, 17 U. PA.J. INT'L ECON. L. 1069, 1122 (1996) (noting
that patent monopoly probably encourages some research that would not otherwise occur
under compulsory licensing regime).
"36 See Burch, supra note 215, at 1164 (noting that in absence of empirical data show-
ing that patents do not result in increased medical research, 'elementary economic prin-
ciples dictate that reducing the potential reward to medical researchers will reduce con-
comitantly the pace of such research").
"' See, e.g., id. at 1170-71.
238 See, e.g., IJ. Fellner, Medical Patents, A Reply, 28J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 678, 682 (1946)
(arguing that AMA or another organization could be charged with custody of patents
issued to doctors and give those doctors royalty while assuring free use by all in medical
profession); Reisman, supra note 19, at 396-401 (proposing that AMA or other medical
organization establish patent clearinghouse to which all doctors must be required to
assign their patents and that this clearinghouse could, in turn, license rights similarly to
copyright clearinghouses); A.T. Sperry, Medical Patents, 28J. PAT. OFF. SoC'v 371, 372
(1946) (noting prior proposal that AMA should be custodian of all patents issued to doc-
tors); Burch, supra note 215, at 1166-71 (proposing mandatory licensing of medical pro-
cedure patents at judicially determined fair price, modeled upon licensing under CAA);
see also Melzer, supra note 138, at 518-19 (proposing licensing of medical procedure pat-
ents in similar manner to copyrights). However, it must be noted that none of these
proposals considered the impact of TRIPS and would likely be inadequate without further
modifications because of the strict requirements under TRIPS for compulsory licensing.
See infra notes 311-17 and accompanying text (discussing requirements of article 31 of
TRIPS).
"' See supra notes 208-13 and accompanying text (noting that prior compulsory licens-
ing statutes provided remuneration).
' See Franklin Pierce Debates, supra note 116, at 642 (quoting Jacobus Rasser, chief
patent counsel of Procter & Gamble, who suggests that PhRMA conduct such study).
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that invention were a method to eliminate a disease or condition
affecting a substantial segment of the population.221
Regardless of the actual effect on innovation, which is not easily
measurable, withholding full patent protection for medical proce-
dures is inconsistent with the patent policy of encouraging re-
search. Although there are occasional exceptions to the patent
holder's exclusionary right, these exceptions are based on public
policies, such as immediate public harm.2n Section 287(c), how-
ever, does not prevent any such harm. Rather, it only limits per-
sonal liability to doctors in certain circumstances. While it is argu-
able that the public might be harmed if doctors considered their
access to medical procedures restricted, these concerns have not
traditionally been considered more important than the patent
right of exclusion.2 Moreover, because section 287(c) leaves doc-
tors with the same issues they faced before its enactment,224 any
countervailing policy argument is questionable in light of the usual
patent policy of encouraging innovation.
In addition, the uncertainty created by vague statutory lan-
guage may reduce innovation, because uncertain patent protec-
tion may create a disincentive to invest time and money developing
an invention.! This problem was recently recognized in Europe,
where uncertainty surrounding the patentability of biotechnology
"I Although the AMA previously discounted situations where the patent system would
have an impact in influencing innovation that would not otherwise occur, its position may
be different in a case where a substantial population is affected.
2 See supra notes 204-13 and accompanying text (discussing limited situations in
which usual exclusionary patent right has been restricted).
" See supra notes 183-201 and accompanying text (noting limited scope of immunity
provisions).
SSee supra note 208 and accompanying text.
n See supra notes 162-82 and accompanying text (describing vague and ambiguous
key terms under § 287(c)).
m Some have even suggested that the availability of strong patents is directly related
to, or at least correlated with, strong technology development. See People's Right to Profit
from Their Own Inventions and Whether Ideas Should Be Patented as Well as the Actual Inventions
(National Public Radio broadcast, Mar. 5, 1999), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Cur-
rent File (statement of Todd Dickinson, PTO Commissioner) (commenting that strength
of U.S. patent system is related to United States having great technological and entrepre-
neurial base); see aLso Report of the Group of Independent Experts on Legislative and
Administrative Simplification, COM(95)288 final/2 at 17 (noting need for proposal on
new directive to clarify that biotechnological inventions are patentable as soon as possible
to avoid further increasing gap between EU and its main competitive countries with re-
spect to investment); Biotechnology in the Community, COM(83)672 final at E3, E5
(noting necessity of patent protection to stimulate biotechnology development in EU to
increase competitiveness of Europe's bio-industries).
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was thought to erode the incentive to invent and the ability to at-
tract investment for development and commercialization.' In
fact, these factors played an important role in the European Un-
ion's decision to enact a directive clarifying that biotechnological
inventions are patentable."
Section 287(c) may also reduce innovation because it bases the
immunity on personal status.2 Section 287(c) is, notably, the first
instance of an exception to patent protection based on individual
status." However, the classes of individuals entitled to special
treatment under section 287(c) seem to be a function of lobbying,
as these groups are not distinct from other groups that section
287(c) does not protect. For example, veterinarians do not enjoy
the immunity although they share the same issues with respect to
restricted access to necessary technology.13 Conversely, HMOs
have immunity under the present provision although they are not
typically cited as needing extra protection under the laws.2s Sec-
See Proposal for a Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inven-
tions, COM(95)661 final at 4 (noting that uncertainty regarding patentability will hamper
investment in research and development for biotechnological inventions).
' See Council Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
6July 1998 on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 13.
It should be noted, however, that although the Directive takes a positive step in affirma-
tively declaring that biological material may be patentable, it does not conclusively resolve
all ambiguity, and arguably creates more ambiguity by adding new tests to determine what
constitutes an invention that violates "ordre public" and "morality." See id. art. 3.1. (pro-
viding that inventions that concern biological material may be patentable); id. art. 6 (pro-
viding examples of what violates "ordre public"). For example, the Directive precludes
patents for processes on cloning humans, processes for germ line therapy and processes
for "modifying the genetic identity of animals which are likely to cause them suffering
without any substantial medical benefit to man or animal, and also animals resulting from
such processes." Id. art. 6(2).
S 3e5 U.S.C. 287(c) (Supp. II 1996).
' See supra Part liA (discussing which individuals are entitled to immunity).
Although veterinarians would be within the definition of a "medical practitioner,"
they would not be entitled to immunity because the statute requires a "medical or surgical
procedure" to be performed on a human body or an animal used in research "directly
relating" to human treatment. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2) (A), (B), (E); see also supra Part
II.B.3 (concerning argument that enforceable patents limit access to necessary medical
care).
2" Indeed, in the last session of Congress, legislation was proposed that would have
narrowed the scope of this exception to preclude providing immunity to these organiza-
tions. Se Judiciay Committee Approves Bill to Reorganize PTO, Amend Patent Law, 54 BNA's
PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHTJ. 83, 83 (1997) (noting that Sen. Hatch proposed amend-
ing section 287(c) so that corporate entities such as hospitals and HMOs would cease to
be given immunity under section 287(c)).
HeinOnline  -- 33 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 651 1999-2000
Unisiy of Caihfornia, Davs [Vol. 33:601
tion 287(c) may even encourage those covered by the statute" -
as well as other interest groups - to push for additional exceptions
from patent liability.' 4
Some suggest that section 287(c) should serve as a model for re-
stricting patentable subject matter in ways that both Congress and
courts have explicitly denied m For example, some have suggested
that section 287(c) be used as a model to counter the Federal Cir-
cuit's position that business methods are patentable.236 In addition,
lobbyists may attack other types of patentable subject matter as im-
" Doctors may next seek to expand their immunity under section 287(c) to eliminate
the present exceptions, so that they are immune from all medical procedure patents.
This proposal is not as far-fetched as it may seem in light of the fact that section 287(c)
fails to address most of the concerns that were raised about medical procedure patents
prior to its enforcement. See supra notes 183-93 and accompanying text (noting limita-
tions of immunity provisions).
'2 Other interest groups may allege that they have unique circumstances that simi-
larlyjustify an exemption from patent infringement. For example, individual inventors or
companies might claim that they need an exception because, in comparison to large
companies, they do not have equivalent means to enforce against patent litigation suits.
See Greg Borzo, Royalty Relief. Procedure Patents Not Enforceable, AM. MED. NEwS, Oct. 21,
1996, at 3 (quoting Donald Dunner, Chair of ABA Intellectual Property Law section, who
states that section 287 sets dangerous precedent and "may invite other groups, such as
generic drugmakers or patient-advocacy organizations, to seek similar exemptions"); N.
Stephan Kinsella & Robert E. Rosenthal, How to Operate Within the Law: Patents on Medical
Procedures, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 5, 1998, at 2 (noting that advocates of patent sys-
tem fear that § 287(c) will result in "'open season' for exceptions to patent protection");
Warren D. Woessner & Michael A. Dryja, US Doctors Find Swift Relief in Patent Law Amend-
ment, IP WORLDWIDE, Mar.-Apr. 1997, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current File (not-
ing that section 287(c) may encourage other industries to push for special exemptions
and amendments to patent system).
' Congress has traditionally declined to enact legislation to ban specific areas from
patentability. See, e.g., S. 387, 103d Cong. § 3 (1993) (proposing two year moratorium on
patenting animals, as well as certain human tissues, organs, and cells); H.R. 4989, 102d
Cong. § 2 (1992) (proposing five-year moratorium on patenting animals); S. 1291, 102d
Cong. § 2 (1991) (proposing to amend patent act to impose five year moratorium on
patenting of animals); S. 2169, 101st Cong. § 2 (1990) (proposing five year moratorium
on patenting of genetically modified animals); H.R. 3247, 101st Cong. § 1 (1989) (propos-
ing to impose two year moratorium on patenting genetically altered animals, except for
animals subject to regulatory review for commercialization); S. 2111, 100th Cong. (1988)
(proposing to amend patent act to ban patenting of genetically modified animals); H.R.
3119, 100th Cong. § 2 (1987) (proposing to introduce moratorium on animal patents for
two years and to revoke previously granted patents on such animals); see also supra note 57
(noting proposed legislation to exclude both medical procedures and apparati from
scoe of patentable subject matter).
See, e.g., Robert M. Kunstadt, Sneak Attack on U.S. Inventiveness, NAT'L LJ., Nov. 9,
1998, at A21; see also John R. Thomas, The Post-Industrialist Patent System, 10 FORDHAM
INTELt. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 3, 47-50 (1999) (suggesting that whether this occurs is
dependent on lobbying ability and noting that medical lobby is known to be one of
strongest lobbying organizations).
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proper for patent protection." These attacks on the patent sys-
tem could limit the scope of patent protection to subject matter for
which there is no powerful lobby to protest patent protection.
B. International Law and Policy
In addition to impacting domestic patent policy, section 287(c)
has international ramifications. In particular, the United States
must maintain certain standards of patent rights as a member of
the World Trade Organization ("WTO") and as a party to TRIPS.
TRIPS established certain minimum standards for intellectual
property protection," including standards of patent protection
with which all member states must comply.2 Failure to adhere to
the TRIPS standards can result in trade retaliations.2
Before section 287(c), certain members of Congress, the Office
of the United States Trade Representatives ("USTR"), and intellec-
tual property lawyers expressed serious concern about interna-
tional repercussions.4 Some congressional members were con-
For example, public opinion has perceived plants, computer software, and busi-
ness methods to be improper subject matter for patentability. See, e.g., Scott Kilman,
Biotech Industry Shivers at Threat to Seed Patents, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 1999, at Bl (noting
controversy surrounding patentability of genetically modified plants).
'" The United States is a party to the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs
("GATT"), and must comply with related agreements such as the Agreement to Establish
the World Trade Organization and the TRIPS agreement. See supra notes 27-28 and ac-
companying text.
m See TRIPS, supra note 28, art. 2 (incorporating Paris Convention requirements into
TRIPS such that even nonsignatories to this convention must comply with it if they are
parties to TRIPS); id. arts. 27-34 (providing provisions regarding patentability that must
be complied with in addition to those incorporated via article 2). In addition, TRIPS
establishes standards for dispute resolution. See id. arts. 41-64.
' In the event that the United States, or any other member state fails to comply with
TRIPS, another member state may demand a consultation in an attempt to correct the
problem. If the parties fail to reach a satisfactory solution, the complaining party may
request an adjudicatory proceeding before a WTO panel according to the Dispute Settle-
ment Understanding. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settle-
ment of Disputes, WTO Agreement, supra note 28, Annex 2, art. 4.5, 33 I.L.M. 1226 [here-
inafter DSU]. The panel then issues a report to the parties and the dispute settlement
body, which adopts the panel report unless there is an appeal to the Appellate Body. If
the nonconforming party fails to implement the recommended action within an allotted
time, compensation and retaliation may occur. See DSU, supra, art. 22.3. See generally
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Trade Law and the GATTIWTO Dispute Settlement
System 1948-1996: An Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND THE GATT/WTO
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 54-72 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed., 1997) (discussing dis-
pute settlement process); Terence P. Stewart & Mara M. Burr, The WTO's First Two and a
Half Years of Dispute Resolution, 23 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 481 (1998) (providing
overview of DSU process, as well as analysis of WTO decisions to date).
"' See infra notes 242-43 and accompanying text.
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cemed that the TRIPS implications had not been adequately dis-
cussed and, in particular, had not been considered by the relevant
congressional committee.24 In addition, the General Counsel of
the USTR, the American Bar Association ("ABA"), and the Ameri-
can Intellectual Property Law Association ("AIPLA") expressed
concern that section 287(c) would violate TRIPS.24
Determining whether section 287(c) violates TRIPS requires an
in-depth examination of all the articles that it may violate, as well as
potential exceptions for any violations.2" Although such an analy-
sis of every potential violation is beyond the scope of this Article, a
brief examination of the TRIPS issues raised by section 287(c) is
warranted here. In particular, section 287(c) raises a substantial
question regarding the United States's compliance with two articles
of TRIPS and therefore provides an additional ground for repeal-
ing section 287(c).'
See, e.g., 142 CONG. REc. 51,843 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1996) (letter from Sens. Hatch
and Roth to Sen. Lott) (noting that proposed section 287(c) falls under Senate Commit-
tee on Finance's jurisdiction because it implicates United States obligations under TRIPS
and that "[t]he Committee on Finance has not had an opportunity to hold a hearing on
this matter to consider these broader ramifications for U.S. trade policy").
m See id. at S11,843-44 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (letter from Jennifer Hillman, Gen-
eral Counsel of USTR, to Sen. Hatch); see id. S11,844 (statement of Sen. Hatch); see id.
S11,846-47 (letter from John R. Kirk,Jr., ABA Chairman, to Sen. Hatch).
Interpretation of specific provisions of TRIPS must be in "accordance with the
customary rules of international law," according to the DSU that applies to TRIPS. See
TRIPS, supra note 28, art. 64 (providing that GAIT Articles XXII and XXIII are applica-
ble "as elaborated and applied by the Dispute Settlement Understanding"); DSU, supra
note 240, art. 3.2. This language has been interpreted to mean that TRIPS should be
interpreted in accordance with the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. See
WrO Dispute Settlement Panel Report on India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical
and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/12, 7.18 (Sept. 5, 1997); WTO Appel-
late Body Report on United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, 35 LL.M. 603 (1996) [hereinafter Reformulated Gasoline Appellate Body Re-
port]; see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Mar. 21, 1986, art. 31(1), 25
I.L.M. 543, 562 (1986) [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (stating general rule for treaty
interpretations). Thus, the TRIPS provisions should be interpreted "in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their con-
text and in the light of its object and purpose." Id. art. 31. In addition, the TRIPS provi-
sions may be interpreted by using "supplementary means of interpretation" such as the
negotiating history when interpretation pursuant to article 31 leaves a meaning ambigu-
ous or obscure, or leads to a result that is "manifestly absurd or unreasonable." Id. art. 32.
"' There may also be an argument that section 287(c) violates the enforcement provi-
sions of TRIPS by failing to allow an effective remedy for patent infringement. Se TRIPS,
supra note 28, arts. 44-45 (requiring that judicial authority exist to allow injunctive relief
and monetary compensation in cases of infringement); see also 142 CONG. REC. SI 1,843-44
(daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (letter from Jennifer Hillman, General Counsel of USTR, to
Sen. Hatch) (noting that section 287 appeared to violate articles 27, 28, 44 and 45 of
TRIPS). However, a detailed analysis of this argument will not be included here because
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1. Requirements of TRIPS
Because section 287(c) limits patent rights, it must be analyzed
with reference to those articles of TRIPS that govern patent rights
- namely, articles 27 and 28. Article 28 specifies the rights con-
ferred by a patent,'" while article 27 provides that those rights be
enjoyable without discrimination.247
a. Article 28
Article 28 delineates the minimum exclusive rights that member
countries must provide to patent owners, and it is the only article
devoted solely to these rights.24  With respect to patented proc-
esses, it states: "A patent shall confer on its owner the following
exclusive rights.., where the subject matter of a patent is a proc-
ess, to prevent third parties not having the owner's consent from
the act of using the process."20 Article 28 thus provides that an
owner of a patented process shall have an exclusive right to prevent
all others from using the patented process. Article 28's exclusive
right requirement is underscored by an examination of the TRIPS
agreement in its entirety. Unlike other TRIPS provisions that set
forth substantive requirements, article 28 itself does not include
any internal exceptions to its requirement that exclusive rights be
provided.m
Contrary to article 28, section 287(c) allows doctors, who consti-
tute third parties, to use a patented process without the owner's
consent. Section 287(c) thus fails to provide the exclusive right to
owners of medical procedure patents, as article 28 requires.
this Article focuses on reasons for repealing section 287(c), rather than a complete ex-
amination of all the ways in which section 287(c) violates TRIPS.
See TRIPS, supra note 28, art. 28.
See id. art. 27(1); see aLso infia notes 253-58 and accompanying text (noting that
article 27(1) sets forth both criteria for determining patentability and requirement for
patent enforcement).
2 See generaly TRIPS, supra note 28, arts. 27-38 (relating to patent rights). In fact,
article 28 is denoted as "Rights Conferred." See i& art. 28.
TRIPS, supra note 28, art. 28.
For example, in contrast to the patentability standard set forth under article 27,
the exclusive rights under article 28 have no exceptions provided within the same article.
Compare id& art. 27, with id. art. 28. Although a separate article of TRIPS does allow an
exception to this exclusive rights requirement, it mandates that any exception be a lim-
ited one; moreover, additional restrictions must be satisfied. See id. art. 30; see also infta
notes 274-79 and accompanying text (discussing interpretation of article 30 exception).
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b. Article 27
Article 27(1) also refers to the exclusive rights that article 28
mandates. Although article 27 does not use the term "exclusive," it
reinforces article 28's concept of exclusivity by stating that "patent
rights [shall be] enjoyable without discrimination. "" However,
some have argued that article 27(1) can also be interpreted tojus-
tify section 287(c) by reading article 27(1) together with article
27(3)'s exception to patentability. 25 However, a review of article
27, including its exceptions, demonstrates that section 287(c) is
inconsistent with this article.m 3
Article 27(1) sets forth two requirements. First, it establishes the
general patentability criteria, which mirror the United States re-
quirements for patentability.' In addition, article 27 requires that
all patents, once issued, be entitled to the same right to exclude
without regard to the subject matter of the patented technology.m
All patent owners should therefore be entitled to the same rights
under article 28. In particular, article 27 provides:
"' TRIPS, supra note 28, art. 27(1) (specifying that there shall be no discrimination in
enjoyment of patent rights based on where invention is created, produced, or subject
matter of invention).
See, e.g., Portman, supra note 29, at 118.
Article 27(1) must be interpreted in light of the other paragraphs of article 27. See
WTO Appellate Body Report on India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agri-
cultural Chemical Products, AB 1997-5, WT/DS50/AB/R, 56 (Dec. 19, 1997) [hereinaf-
ter WTO Appellate Body Report on India, Dec. 19, 1999] (noting that paragraphs (b) and
(c) of article 70.8 constitute proper context for interpreting provision at issue - article
70.8(a)).
' SeeTRIPS, supra note 28, art. 27(1) (i[Platents shall be available for any inventions
... in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and
are capable of industrial application."). Although two of the terms stated under article 27
- "inventive step" and "capable of industrial application" - are not identical to terms
under United States patent law, article 27 nonetheless intended to be roughly analogous
to the standards under United States patent law. This intent is indicated by a footnote to
article 27 which states that these terms should be understood to be identical to United
States terms under section 101. See id. at n.5; see also supra notes 33-35 and accompanying
text (describing requirements for patentability under U.S. law). But see Carlos M. Correa,
Patent Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT, supra note 97, at 189, 200-01 (noting difference between United States term
"utility" and narrow term of "industrial applicability," and that terms remain unharmon-
ized after TRIPS); cf. J.H. Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition
Under the TRIPS Agreement 29 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 11, 30-32 (1997) (noting that coun-
tries are free to adopt their own standards of novelty, usefulness, and other patent re-
quirements).
See TRIPS, supra note 28, art. 27(1) (providing that "patent rights" shall be "enjoy-
able without discrimination as to the ... field of technology"). The term "field of tech-
nology" is generally interpreted as equivalent to "subject matter." See, e.g., Correa, supra
note 254, at 202-03.
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1. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3, patents shall
be available for any inventions, whether products or proc-
esses, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new,
involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial appli-
cation. Subject to paragraph 4 of Article 65, paragraph 8 of
Article 70 and paragraph 3 of this Article, patents shall be
available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination
as to the place of invention, the field of technology and
whether products are imported or locally produced.
2. Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the pre-
vention within their territory of the commercial exploitation
of which is necessary to protect ordre public or morality, in-
cluding to protect human, animal or plant life or health or
to avoid serious prejudice to the environment, provided that
such exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation
is prohibited by their law.
3. Members may also exclude from patentability:
(a) diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the
treatment of humans or animals.
Most of the exceptions to article 27(1) are irrelevant to the issue
of whether section 287(c) is inconsistent with article 27(1). The
articles to which article 27(1) refers - articles 65 and 70 - apply
only to developing countries." 7 Articles 27(2) and 27(3) do not
apply to section 287(c) because they are exceptions to the pat-
entability standard in article 27(1), not enforcement of patent
rights.2 However, a closer examination of article 27(3) is war-
ranted because it relates to the same subject matter as section
287(c).
Some critics of medical procedure patents have read article
27(1) to allow discrimination against the enforcement of medical
procedure patents because article 27(3) allows these procedures to
TRIPS, supra note 28, art. 27.
Article 65, paragraph 4 allows a developing country to delay compliance with pro-
viding product patents as required under article 27 if such patents were not previously
provided. See id. art. 65(4). Similarly, article 70, paragraph 8 provides a procedure in lieu
of full patent protection during this period of delayed compliance. See id. art. 70(8). See
genera/y WTO Appellate Body Report on India, Dec. 19, 1999, supra note 253 (providing
explanation of these exceptions); Charters Macdonald-Brown & Leon Ferera, First WTO
Decision on TRPS, 2 EuR. INTELL. PROP. Rxv. 69 (1998) (describing Appellate Body Re-
port, as well as requirements of articles 65(4) and 70(8)).
"a See TRIPS, supra note 28, art. 27(2) (specifying *[m]embers may exclude from
patentabili) (emphasis added).
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be completely excluded from patentability in the first instance!"
Under this interpretation of article 27, medical procedure patents
with limited enforcement rights are allowable as a category of the
article 27(3) exception. Section 287(c) would therefore be per-
missible because, although it discriminates against medical proce-
dure patent owners, TRIPS allows nations to prohibit the patenting
of the subject matter altogether.
While this interpretation is tempting, it is not consistent with the
actual text of TRIPS. Article 27(1) literally requires all issued pat-
ents to be enforceable; it does not state that a country may enforce
patent rights differently depending on whether the subject matter
is a type that need not be allowed in the first instance."o Also, the
portion of article 27(1) relating to patent rights should be read in
its proper context, not in isolation. In this case, the proper context
includes article 28 because that article similarly relates to patent
rights.2' Interpreting the patent enforcement right requirement in
view of the patentability exceptions of article 27 is inappropriate, 2
See, e.g., Portman, supra note 29, at 118. This could be buttressed by the argument
that because the initial object of TRIPS was to reduce trade distortions, section 287(c)
would be permissible because it would be unlikely to impact trade as most nations do not
even patent what the United States is declining to enforce. See supra notes 76-81 and
accompanying text (describing how other nations limit patent protection for medical
procedures); see also Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, Sept. 20, 1986, GATT
B.I.S.D. (33d Supp.) at 19 (1987) (stating that aim of including intellectual property in
Uruguay Round negotiations was "to reduce the distortions and impediments to interna-
tional trade"); TRIPS, supra note 28, preamble (noting need to provide "adequate stan-
dards and principles concerning... trade-related intellectual property rights"). However,
the object and purpose of the concluded TRIPS agreement is not necessarily tied purely
to trade. See David W. Leebron, An Overview of the Uruguay Round Results, 34 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L 11, 29 (1995) (noting that "[d]espite its name, the TRIPS is really not a
trade agreement at all; it does not contain commitments regarding trade in intellectual
property. The only obligation is to protect such property, and that does not necessarily
entail trade."). In addition, the inclusion of intellectual property standards in the GATT
regime, rather than in a freestanding international agreement, was primarily for political
reasons. See, e.g., Hans Peter Kunz-Hallstein, The United States Proposal for a GATT-
Agreement on Intellectual Propery and the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Prop-
en), in GATr OR WIPO?: NEw WAYS IN THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF IwrELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 77-79 (Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds., 1989) (noting that
United States first introduced idea of intellectual property into GATT regime because it
perceived GATr forum to be friendlier environment to its causes, rather than because
issues were solely trade-based).
See TRIPS, supra note 28, art. 27(1).
" See id. arts. 27-28.
See generally Vienna Convention, supra note 244, art. 31 (requiring interpretations
of treaty terms in light of context).
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as article 27's exceptions expressly pertain to patentability, not en-
forceability.'
Finally, the negotiation history of TRIPS also supports a literal
reading of article 27, which dictates that section 287(c) is inconsis-
tent with TRIPS.2 Although unenforceable medical procedure
patents were not contemplated during the TRIPS negotiations, the
possibility of unenforceable patents was." Before TRIPS, devel-
oped countries were concerned about obtaining patents" and en-
forcing them in other countries.27
Article 27(1) was intended to address both of these concerns by
establishing a general presumption of patentability for all subject
matter and ensuring that subject matter deemed patentable would
be enforceable.2 The "field of technology" language, as well as
the prohibition of discrimination based on importation, was added
to article 27(1) to prevent patents from being de facto unenforce-
able.6 It would thus be more consistent with the negotiation his-
tory of TRIPS to enforce equally all issued patents; otherwise, na-
tions could defeat the intended patent scheme b refusing to en-
force patents using the exceptions of article 27. In particular,
SeeTRIPS, supra note 28, art. 27(3).
See Vienna Convention, supra note 244, arts. 31-32 (allowing ability to "supplemen-
tary means of interpretation" such as negotiating history when interpretation pursuant to
article 31 leaves unclear or ambiguous meaning).
For example, compulsory licensing of patents under the Paris Convention made
them effectively unenforceable. See G.H.C. BODENHAUSEN, GUIDE TO THE APPLICATION OF
THE PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 71 (1968).
"a See Correa, supra note 254, at 191-92 (noting that prior to TRIPS more than 50
countries did not allow patent protection for at least one type of subject matter, with
pharmaceuticals being one of most common exclusions). See genera/y World Intellectual
Property Organization, Existence, Scope and Form of Generally Internationally Accepted and
Applied Standards/Norms For the Protection of Intellectual Proper , MTN.GNG/NGll
/W/24/Rev.1, Annex II (Sept. 1988) (summarizing exclusions from patent protection for
subject matter including pharmaceutical products, pharmaceutical processes, animal
varieties, methods for treatment of human or animal body, food products, computer
projrams and chemical products).
Outside the United States this was explicitly sanctioned worldwide by the Paris
Convention, which allows its members to limit patent rights for failure to work a patent
locally. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, last
revised, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305; BODENHAUSEN, supra note 265, at
67-73. Unenforceable patents were often the result of compulsory licensing requirements
that discriminated against foreign patent owners by requiring owners to grant a license if
they did not produce the patented product locally.
" See, e.g., DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFFING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS
147-48 (1998).
See id. at 148; Correa, supra note 254, at 202-03.
In addition, requiring equal enforcement would be more consistent with the policy
of establishing uniform and certain patent protection.
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countries could use article 27(3) to justify their refusal to enforce
the very types of patents that article 27 was crafted to protect -
biotechnological patents.27 Moreover, because separate articles of
TRIPS already address patents with limited enforcement rights -
namely, articles 30 and 31 - article 27 should not be interpreted
to address the same issueY' Because section 287(c) restricts the
patent holder's right to exclude and treats medical procedure pat-
ents differently from other patents, it violates articles 27 and 28 of
TRIPS.
2. Exceptions to TRIPS
Although section 287(c) is inconsistent with articles 27 and 28 of
TRIPS, an actual violation of TRIPS occurs only when the inconsis-
tency lacks an excuse under another portion of TRIPS.r Whether
section 287(c) violates TRIPS, thus, depends on articles 30 and 31,
the provisions of TRIPS that excuse noncompliance with the gen-
eral requirement that all patents be provided exclusive rights.
These articles, however, do not excuse section 287(c)'s noncom-
pliance.
a. Article 30
Article 30 allows a member state to provide "limited exceptions"
to the exclusive rights that TRIPS ordinarily requires as long as
article 30's requirements are satisfied.24 As noted, article 28 enti-
tes the owner of a patented process to exclude all others from us-
ing that process; however, patent rights are subject to article 30's
exception.2 What constitutes a "limited exception" under article
30, though, is not clear.26 Article 30 states: "Members may provide
" See TRIPS, supra note 28, art. 27(3); supra notes 264-69 and accompanying text
(concerning negotiating history of article 27).
SSeeTRIPS, supra note 28, arts. 30-31.
" See genenay id arts. 7-8, 30-31 (providing grounds for exceptions from usual TRIPS
requirements).
"' See id. art. 30.
"' See id. art. 28; see also supra notes 248-50 and accompanying text (discussing article
28).
Perhaps predictably, article 30 has been invoked both to support the assertion that
section 287(c) is TRIPS-compliant, and to support the assertion that section 287(c) vio-
lates TRIPS. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. S11,845 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Hatch) (asserting that article 30 fails to save section 287(c)); id. at S11,843-44 (letter of
Jennifer Hillman, General Counsel of USTR, to Sen. Hatch) (asserting that section 287(c)
is not exempt under article 30); Burgoon, supra note 19, at 119; Mossinghoff, supra note
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limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent,
provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a
normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably preju-
dice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of
the legitimate interests of third parties."r The article cannot be
reasonably interpreted to swallow entirely the substantive patent
provisions of TRIPS. Panel decisions by the WTO, the organization
responsible for enforcing TRIPS, have reinforced the idea that ex-
ceptions are intended to be just that - exceptions that do not
emasculate the general principles established in the agreements.r
Because the fundamental principle behind the patent provisions is
to provide exclusive rights, allowing article 30 to provide an excep-
tion for all activity would be improper. But attempting to define
an appropriate scope for article 30's limited exception is notably
difficult. Whether section 287(c) is a justifiable limited exception
under article 30 depends on whether it, (1) "unreasonably con-
flict[s] with a normal exploitation" of a medical procedure patent,
and (2) "unreasonably prejudice[s] the legitimate interests of the
18, at 796-97 (applying "real world" gloss to interpretation of TRIPS to conclude that
because most corporate patentees of medical procedures do not sue doctors, such suits
would not be "normal exploitation of patents under article 30"). It should be noted that
a WTO panel has addressed the scope of article 30 for the first time in a recent decision;
however, it did so in an unrelated dispute and the parties still have the right to appeal the
decision as this Article goes to press. See WTO dispute Settlement Report on Canada -
Patent Protection of Pharmacutical Products, WTO doc. WT/DS 114/R (Mar. 17, 2000).
This Article is not based on this recent WTO decision; rather it is an independent evalua-
tion of article 30 in accordance with the Vienna Convention.
TRIPS, supra note 28, art. 30.
See, e.g., Reformulated Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note 244, at 16 (not-
ing that exceptions of Article XX of GATT "should not be so applied as to frustrate or
defeat the legal obligations... under the substantive rules of the General Agreement").
Although WTO panel decisions are not binding except with respect to the specific parties
referred to in the reports, they are often considered persuasive authority by subsequent
panels and create legitimate expectations among members. See, e.g., WTO Dispute Set-
tlement Panel Report on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WTO Doc. AB-1996-2,
WT/DS1/AB/R, WT/DS1O/AB/R, WT/DS22/AB/4, at 11 (Nov. 1, 1996); see also David
Palmeter & Petros C. Mavroidis, The WTO Legal System. Sourne of Law, 92 AM. J. INT'L L.
398, 404 (1998) (noting that "it is reasonable to presume that, absent unusual circum-
stances, panels will follow the decisions of the Appellate Body in much the same way that
a lower court follows the decisions of a higher court"). This was recently demonstrated
when a second WTO panel deferred to an earlier panel and appellate body decision,
although noting that the prior decisions were not binding precedent. See WTO Dispute
Settlement Panel Report on India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricul-
tural Chemical Products, WT/DS79/R, 7.30 (Aug. 24, 1998).
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patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third
parties.""g
The first limit to the exception depends on what constitutes "un-
reasonable conflict with a normal exploitation" of a patent. 0 A
patent provides its owner with the right to exclude others;" ' how-
ever, in the case of medical procedure patents, unless the patent is
licensed, its owner is unlikely to maximize financial benefit from
the patent.m Accordingly, it is uncommon for a patent owner to
refuse to license to others because that refusal would not maximize
financial return.2 It has been suggested that normal exploitation
of a patent includes typical activity, such as licensing, and excludes
atypical activity, such as refusals to license.2 The question can
thus be rephrased as whether section 287(c) in fact unreasonably
conflicts with a patent owner's ability to license the patent.
Although section 287(c) does not completely preclude a patent
owner from licensing a patent, it does effectively preclude the
owner from licensing direct users." Section 287(c) theoretically
still permits the owner of a medical procedure patent to exploit a
patent by licensing someone that is not covered by section 287(c).
That person would likely be a supplier that could be liable as a con-
tributory infringer - in other words, someone that contributes to
a doctor's direct infringement by supplying the doctor with the
SSee Carlos M. Correa, Implementing the TRIPS Agreement in the Patents Fwld. Options for
Deeloping Countries, 1J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 75, 90 (1998) (stating that article 30 should
be interpreted as requiring three conditions be applied, taking into account interests of
third parties, but not actually applying these conditions). In addition, it has been sug-
gested that section 287(c) is not a "limited exception" when compared to other excep-
tions under the United States Patent Act. See 142 CONG. REC. S 11,843-44 (daily ed. Sept.
30, 1996) (letter of Jennifer Hillman, General Counsel of USTR, to Sen. Hatch) (noting
that precluding both damages and injunctive relief "goes far beyond other exceptions
provided in title 35").
0 See TRIPS, supra note 28, art. 30.
See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); TRIPS, supra note 28, art. 28.
See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text (discussing incentives to license).
This excludes the situation of blocking patents whereby a patent is obtained merely to
prevent a competitor from using technology covered by the patent and the owner refuses
to license the patent to essentially force the competitor out of business.
SSee Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1536 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (Newman,J., concurring), 520 U.S. 17, 40-41 (1997).
"' It has been suggested that when a patentee refuses to use a patented invention or
license it, such nonuse would not constitute exploitation because the term exploit implies
some affirmative act, such as licensing. See Weissman, supra note 215, at 1110 (citing
Black's Law Dictionaty for definition of "exploit"); see also Franklin Pierce Debates, supra note
116, at 630-31 (presenting comments of patent attorney Robert Annitage).
m See supra notes 154-58 and accompanying text (describing how section 287(c)
provides doctors - direct users - with immunity).
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means to infringe.2 Section 287(c) does not provide immunity
from contributory infringement, nor does it provide immunity to
any person who is not a medical practitioner.287 Because section
287(c) provides immunity from damages but does not alter what
constitutes direct infringement, it is still possible for contributory
infringement to exist.20 Because of the strict requirements for con-
tributory infringement, it will not exist in every case in which a doc-
tor directly infringes a medical procedure patent.2 Therefore, a
patent owner's ability to exploit a medical procedure patent
through licensing is significantly reduced if the pool of potential
licensees is limited to contributory infringers. It is questionable
whether the limited exploitation available by licensing contributory
infringers should even be considered within the definition of
"normal" exploitation. A plain text reading of "normal" exploita-
tion encompasses exploitation of the most typical users - the li-
censing of doctors."O
In addition, TRIPS does not require members to recognize con-
tributory infringement. The exclusive rights that each member
country must provide under TRIPS are limited to direct infringe-
ment, although each nation is free to provide additional rights,
See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); see also supra note 139 (noting that
contributory infringers are often sued for infringement of medical procedure patents).
See35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (Supp. 111996).
See i& In fact, the ability to sue manufacturers as contributory infringers was one
reason why a prior bill failed - it declared doctors' activity as not constituting direct
infringement and thereby eliminated the possibility of recovery from anyone because
direct infringement must exist for contributory infringement to exist. See S. 1334, 104th
Cong. § 2 (1995); see also Public Hearing, supra note 19, § 2 (noting sources for additional
information concerning legislative history).
SSee 35 U.S.C. § 271(c).
Whoever offers to sell or sells... or imports a component of a pat-
ented machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a material
or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a mate-
rial part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or espe-
cially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple
article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing
use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.
Id.; see also 5 CHISUM, supra note 52, § 17.03 (explaining requirements of contributory
infringement). The knowledge requirement that must be proven to establish contribu-
tory infringement is particularly hard to show. See, e.g., Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top
Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 488-90 (1964); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb
Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 894 (1976) (defining normal to include
.regular, standard, natural, typical").
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such as contributory infringement. 9 Because TRIPS only requires
members to preclude direct infringement, an "unreasonable con-
flict with normal exploitation" may only refer to conflict with the
exploitation that occurs with direct infringement.
The second limit to article 30's exception is that there cannot be
"unreasonabl[e] prejudice" to the "legitimate interests" of the pat-
ent holder, keeping in mind the "legitimate interests of third par-
ties."2 As a preliminary matter, this Article assumes that the pat-
ent holder's legitimate interests are distinct from the normal ex-
ploitation of a patent, to avoid redundancy29 Consistent with the
previous analysis that "normal exploitation" only includes licensing
to the direct user, the "legitimate interests" of the patent holder
should encompass all other interests that the owner may have in
the patent. For example, legitimate interests would include licens-
ing contributory infringers and refusing to license or even use the
patented invention.!
The "third parties" to which article 30 refers presumably include
all unauthorized users of a patent.25 For medical procedure pat-
ents, medical practitioners are relevant third parties whose inter-
ests are relevant; however, patients should also be considered third
parties. They might be third parties either based on actual use of
the patented invention or because their interests are affected by
whether medical practitioners can use the patented invention."6
For this analysis, whether doctors alone or doctors and patients are
Sw TRIPS, supra note 28, art. 28(1) (prohibiting third parties from directly infring-
ing, but not prohibiting anyone from assisting in direct infringing acts); see also id. art. 2
(stating that TRIPS is minimum requirement).
TRIPS, supra note 28, art. 30.
At first glance, this requirement seems redundant of the previous requirement.
However, the two clauses are joined by the conjunctive "and," rather than the disjunctive
"or,* suggesting that they are intended to be separate requirements.
"4 See supra notes 286-89 and accompanying text (discussing contributory infringe-
ment). Also, the patent right provides a right to exclude others and does not demand
that the patent owner use the invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 271.
"4 Although third parties are not defined within article 30, third parties are refer-
enced elsewhere in the TRIPS agreement with regard to a patent owner's right to ex-
clude. In particular, article 28 states that a patent owner has a right to prevent third
parties from using a patented invention without the owner's consent. See TRIPS, supra
note 28, art. 28.
"4 In addition, it could be argued that patients are part of the relevant third parties
even if they do not directly use the patented procedures because their interests are impli-
cated by the exclusivity of the use of the patented procedures. See supra notes 134-43 and
accompanying text (discussing implications of patents on patient care); see also Portman,
supra note 29, at 119 (including patients, medical practitioners and general public as
relevant third parties).
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considered third parties should not make a difference because
their interests are aligned."7
Once the third parties are identified, the legitimate interests of
third parties must be determined. Although article 30 does not
define "legitimate interests," other portions of the TRIPS agree-
ment suggest what this term should include. For example, the in-
terests of third parties in using technological knowledge for social
and economic welfare could be read into article 30 based on lan-
guage in other articles of TRIPS emphasizing the need to recog-
nize these interests. Social welfare includes the interests of medi-
cal practitioners to have unrestricted access to patented technol-
ogy. On the other hand, medical 0rocedure patents do not nec-
essarily compromise these interests.
The critical question is whether 287(c) provides access to pat-
ented technologies - a legitimate interest of third parties - with-
out unreasonably prejudicing the legitimate interest of patent
holders to exploit their patents. Although article 30 itself provides
no guidance, a prior draft of this provision does shed some light on
acceptable limitations that balance the interests of the patent
Both doctors and patients have interests in assuring that access to medical proce-
dures is not restricted. See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text. Although doctors
have some additional interests concerning medical procedures that do not overlap with
patients, they do not necessarily have to be discussed to engage in the balancing under
article 30. For example, the argument that medical procedures impinge on the sharing
norm of doctors will not be directly addressed here, although it is acknowledged that it
would also likely constitute a 'legitimate* interest under article 30.
' For example, article 7, which is labeled as 'Objectives," emphasizes that protection
of intellectual property rights should contribute to "the promotion of technological inno-
vation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of
producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and
economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations." TRIPS, supra note 28, art.
7; see also id. preamble (noting that public policy objectives of nations need to be re-
spected even though intellectual property rights are private rights). In addition, article 8
explicitly acknowledges the importance of allowing members to adopt laws as necessary to
protect public health and public interest See id. art. 8. Professor Reichman has suggested
that articles 7 or 8, either standing alone or in conjunction with article 30, should provide
developing countries with substantial leeway in 'complying" with TRIPS. See J.H.
Reichman, Beond the Historical Lines of Demarcation: Competition Law, Intellectual Pe*"
Rights, and Intenatonal Trade After the GATT's Uruguay Round, 20 BROOK. L. REV. 75, 100
(1993); see also Michael Halewood, Regulating Patent Holders: Local WorkingRequirements and
Compulsoiy Licensing at International Law, 35 OSGOODE HALL UJ. 243, 264-65 (1997) (sug-
gesting that article 8 factors be read into article 30).
Se supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
Se supra notes 137-48 and accompanying text (discussing illusory problem with
restricted access).
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holder and those of third parties.nOl These limitations include im-
munity for prior use,m noncommercial private use, experimental
use, and government use.3 Although these examples were not
intended to be the only types of situations that article 30 covers,$O
they nonetheless reveal what drafters envisioned as appropriate
balances under article 30."5 All of these examples deal with activity
that would normally constitute direct infringement but is excepted
from infringement for social policy reasons, for example, to avoid
hindering research by imposing liability for mere experimental
uses. Furthermore, section 287(c) encompasses activity much
broader than these exceptions; it covers a third party's private,
commercial use of a patented method.n
The examination of the appropriate balance here may not be
done anew. Some have suggested that great deference to a mem-
ber state's determination is appropriate when balancing interests
under article 30." But undue deference would result in the TRIPS
See Status of Work in the Negotiating Group: Chairman's Report to the GNG, GATT Doc.
MTN.GNG/NGI 1/W/76 (July 23, 1990), reprinted in GERVAIS, supra note 268, at 158 (pro-
viding less requirements for "limited exception" provision and stating "[p]rovided that
legitimate interests of the proprietor of the patent and of third parties are taken into
account, limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent may be made for
certain acts, such as") (emphasis added).
" Although not defined in the prior draft, "prior use" is a term that is recognized in
some countries as an equitable principle under patent law that essentially immunizes
prior users of technology that elected to forgo patent protection from being sued as in-
fringers by someone that later patents what he has been using. Although not presently an
aspect of the United States patent system, Congress recently enacted a limited prior use
provision applicable only to business method patents that is a defense to patent infringe-
ment. See First Inventor Defense Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 4301, 113 Stat. 1501
(1999).
See id.
See supra note 301 (indicating that situations are intended to be merely illustrative
only by denoting "such as").
' It has also been suggested that the categories proposed in prior drafts of article 30
would be properly within the scope of article 30. See Correa, supra note 279, at 91.
It is presumed that no compensation is required under article 30 because of the
omission of language concerning compensation or reasonable compensation, especially
because such language is included under article 31. See TRIPS, supra note 28, arts. 30-31;
see also WTO Dispute Settlement Panel Report on Indonesia - Certain Measures Affect-
ing the Automobile Industry, W'/DS54/R, 14.210 (July 2, 1998).
Prior use includes commercial use, but commercial use prior to the existence of a
patent whereas 287(c) allows people to use the patented invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)
(Supp. 111996).
. It has been suggested, that to the extent the panel and appellate body have author-
ity to review whether article 30 applies, they should exercise extreme deference to mem-
ber states. SeeJ.H. Reichman, Enforcing theEnforcement Procedures of the TRIPS Agreement, 37
VA.J. INT'L L. 335,337 (1997) (noting that dispute settlement panels should "show a high
degree of respect for, or deference to, good faith applications of local laws to the facts
666
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provisions' having no meaning because great deference would jus-
tify, under- article 30, almost any national law.' In addition, sec-
tion 287(c) deserves little deference because Congress engaged in
minimal debate concerning TRIPS compliance before enacting
it.31
and issues in dispute."); see alsoJudith Bello, Some Practical Observations About WTO Settle-
ment oflntelectual Property Disputes, 37 VA.J. INT'L L. 357,364-65 (1997) (noting that WTO
panel should not usurp role of government negotiations); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss &
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achieuemeits of the Uruguay Round. Putting TRIPS and Dispute
Settlement Together, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 275, 304-05 (1997) (suggesting that TRIPS violation
require some additional showing of violation of nondiscrimination because TRIPS is
intended as minimum, rather than "optimum" requirement of intellectual property stan-
dards); Peter Lichtenbaum, Procedurallssues in WTODispute Resolution, 19 MICH.J. INT'L L.
1195, 1233-37 (1998) (suggesting that standard for review in cases other than in anti-
dumping context are to be less deferential in light of specific language in Anti-Dumping
Agreement, as well as requirement under DSU that panels make "objective assessment" of
both legal and factual issues); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Asserting Copyright's Democratic
Principles in the Global Arena, 51 VAND. L. REV. 217, 311 (1998) (noting that WTO.panel
should accord more deference to allegedly noncomplying member's good faith interpre-
tation of TRIPS when member state's efforts attempt to accommodate free speech values).
But see Steven P. Croley &John H.Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, Standards of Retiew, and
Deference to National Governments, 90 AM.J. INT'L L. 193, 211-12 (1996) (arguing for more
balanced standard of review to maintain credibility of WTO system).
See Lichtenbaum, supra note 308, at 1237 (noting that "[i]f panels deferred to
national interpretations, this could result in a number of diverging permissible interpre-
tatios... [that] 'could transform the WTO into a "tower of Babel" and conflict with the
declared object of the WTO dispute settlement procedures to protect legal security").
Further, undue deference would also contravene the Dispute Settlement Understanding
agreement (DSU) that applies to TRIPS. This agreement requires that WTO panels
"make an objective assessment of the matter... including an objective assessment of the
facts of the case and the application of and conformity with the relevant covered agree-
ments." DSU, supra note 240, art. 11; see also Stewart & Burr, supra note 240, at 635-36
(noting that during negotiations United States suggested and then rejected deference to
member states). In addition, the Appellate Body has thus far refused to rubber stamp all
actions that member states bring under TRIPS. See, e.g., WTO Appellate Body Report on
India, Dec. 19, 1999, supra note 253, 66. The Appellate Body, for example, considered
Indian law to determine whether it had complied with TRIPS. See id. It recognized that
to give India the benefit of doubt regarding whether its administrative instructions ade-
quately complied with TRIPS "would be to say that only India can assess whether Indian
law is consistent with India's obligations under the WTO Agreement." Id. According to
the Appellate Body, "[t]his, clearly cannot be so." Id.
"* See supra note 20 and accompanying text; see also 142 CONG. REC. S 11,843 (daily ed.
Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (noting that "[t]he Committee on Finance has
not had an opportunity to hold a hearing on this matter to consider these broader ramifi-
cations for U.S. trade policy").
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b. Article 31
Article 31 applies when a member country allows use of a pat-
ented invention not allowed under article 30.3" Although it does
not use the phrase "compulsory license," article 31 essentially gov-
erns compulsory licensing of patents. In particular, article 31
states:
Where the law of a Member allows for other use [other than
that allowed under article 30] of the subject matter of a patent
without the authorization of the right holder, including use by
the government or third parties authorized by the government,
312the following provisions shall be respected ....
The activity that article 31 describes is much more like that to
which section 287(c) applies than that described in article 30. Sec-
tion 287(c) is, literally, a "law... [that] allows for other use"M of a
patent without authorization of the patent holder, and it contem-
plates use by "third parties authorized by the government."314
Medical practitioners are the third parties, and the government
authorizes their unrestricted use of medical procedure patents un-
der section 287(c). Although section 287(c) does not provide
medical practitioners with an affirmative right to use, its provision
of immunity is tantamount to that right.
16
"' See TRIPS, supra note 28, art. 31 (noting that it applies where member's laws "al-
lows for other use of the subject matter of a patent without the authorization of the right
holder'; id. art. 31 n.a (defining "other use" as "use other than that allowed under Article
30").
Id. art. 31. In addition, article 31 has been presumed to cover compulsory licens-
ing. See, e.g., FREDERICK ABBo'rr ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL INTELLE TUAL PROPERTY
SYSTEM: COMMENTARY AND MATERIAlS 710-11 (1999); GERvAls, supra note 268, at 165.
" It is unclear whether the definition of "other use" for article 31 means that the
subject matter under article 31 must be subject matter never included under article 30, or
that it means that the subject matter has failed the requirements of article 30. In either
event, because the former section concluded that article 30 was ambiguous at best con-
cerning whether it exempted article 287(c), as well as the fact that neither article explic-
itly has a subject matter requirement, it seems appropriate at this juncture to continue the
analysis for article 31.
TRIPS, supra note 28, art. 31.
,, See genera/ly supra notes 154-61 and accompanying text (noting that section 287(c)
provides doctors with de facto compulsory license).
"' This reading also seems consistent with patent law, which provides patent owners
with a right to exclude, rather than an affirmative right to use. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994
& Supp. IV 1998) (providing right to exclude all others, rather than right to use). Ac-
cordingly, exemptions from patent doctrine provide immunity from infringement, rather
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Article 31 allows noncompliance with the substantive articles of
TRIPS - including articles 27 and 28 - where a compulsory i-
cense satisfies the following requirements:
(1) the licensed use must be based on its "individual merits,"
(2) the proposed user must first attempt to obtain authorization
from the patent owner on "reasonable commercial terms
and conditions" within a reasonable period of time (unless
in cases of extreme urgency, in which the patent owner
must be notified as soon as "reasonably practicable")
(3) the scope and duration of use must be limited to the pur-
pose for which it is authorized,
(4) the use must be non-exclusive,
(4) the use must be non-assignable,
(5) the use must be authorized predominantly for the supply of
the domestic market,
(6) the authorized use must be subject to termination when cir-
cumstances that led to it cease to exist and are unlikely to
occur,
(7) the right holder must be paid "adequate remuneration,"
(8) the legal validity of a determination relating to authoriza-
tion of use should be subject tojudicial review,
(9) any decision relating to remuneration shall be subject toju-
dicial review.
Section 28 7 (c) fails to comply with article 31's requirements on
several grounds. First, section 287(c) allows all medical practitio-
ners to use patented inventions that fall within section 287(c) and
does not grant the authorization on its individual merits.""5 Article
31 requires that the allowed use be determined on a case-by-case
basis, not for entire categories of inventions.3'9 Based on this re-
than affirmative right to use. See, e.g., id. § 271(e). To do otherwise would result in pro-
viding more under an exemption than under the original grant of a patent.
S" TRIPS, supra note 28, art. 31. Compulsory licenses as remedies for antitrust viola-
tions are subject to additional requirements. See id. art. 31(k). Similarly, article 31 pro-
vides additional requirements where compulsory licensing is authorized to allow exploita-
tion of a patent that cannot be exploited without infringement. See id. art. 31 (1).
'" See 35 U.S.C. 287(c) (Supp. 111996).
"' See GERVAIS, supra note 268, at 165 (stating that "compulsory licenses under which
certain categories of inventions automatically become eligible for a license would seem to
violate this provision"); Correa, supra note 254, at 213 (stating that compulsory licenses
cannot be "based on general rules (e.g., all patents relating to certain kinds of technology)
"); see also INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS
AGREEmENT, supra note 97, at 430 (reprinting Communication from United States (May
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quirement alone, section 287(c) fails to comply with article 31 be-
cause it treats all medical procedure patents uniformly, rather than
looking at the merits of each medical procedure patent.' In addi-
tion, section 287(c) does not require medical practitioners to at-
tempt to negotiate a license or even inform the patent holder after
an emergency use where there is no time to seek prior permis-
sion.'21 Furthermore, section 287(c) does not provide any remu-
neration, much less the "adequate remuneration" that article 31
requires.3s Because section 287(c) does not comply with the re-
quirements of articles 30 and 31,m its failure to comply with articles
27 and 28 is not permissible.s4
11, 1990) that states that "[e]ach case involving the possible grant of a compulsory license
shall be considered on its individual merits" in proposed article 27).
m See35 U.S.C. 287(c).
Compare id. (allowing medical practitioners to use patented inventions without any
need to try to negotiate licenses on reasonable terms), with TRIPS, supra note 28, art.
31 (b) (contemplating that proposed users will attempt to negotiate licenses with patent
holders prior to use). Further, article 31 should only be triggered after efforts to achieve
licenses on "reasonable commercial terms and conditions" have been unsuccessful within
a reasonable period of time. See TRIPS, supra note 28, art. 31(b). This requirement may
be waived in the event of "circumstances of extreme urgency." Id. But, even in such
situations the right holder must still be notified "as soon as reasonably practicable" of the
use. Id. In contrast, section 287(c) does not require the medical practitioner to ever
notify the patentee of use either before or after the patented invention is used. Se 35
U.S.C. § 287(c) (providing no requirements for negotiation).
' Compare 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (providing no remuneration requirement), with TRIPS,
supra note 28, art. 31 (h) (requiring "adequate remuneration"). Granted, it is conceivable
that a patent owner may obtain monetary relief from persons other than medical practi-
tioners, such as contributory infringers who are not included under the terms of section
287. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (providing exception only to direct infringement and in-
ducement to infringe); see also supra note 139 and accompanying text (describing how
manufacturer may be sued). However, article 31 does not state that the right holder
should be entitled to remuneration for some unauthorized uses of the patent. See TRIPS,
supra note 28, art. 31. Rather, article 31 specifies what must apply for every use of a pat-
ent that is not authorized. See id. Thus, section 287(c) would still fail to comply with this
reasonable remuneration requirement even if the patentee were able to obtain remunera-
tion from those who are not medical practitioners.
SSee TRIPS, supra note 28, art. 31 (i)-(j) (requiringjudicial review of decision author-
izing compulsory licensing).
' In addition, it would be difficult to revise section 287(c) such that it would comply
with article 31 while still addressing the concerns of the medical community. For exam-
ple, TRIPS requires that the patent owner be notified prior to or as soon as possible after
the unauthorized use. See id. art. 31(b). For a doctor to notify the patentee concerning
use, the doctor must as a threshold matter at least be aware of the existence of a patent.
Thus, a doctor would have the burden of both (a) determining whether there was a rele-
vant patent, and (b) seeking out the patent owner. However, doctors have objected to
patenting and enforcing medical procedure patents on the very ground that they do not
want to be involved in determining whether patents exist that they must be aware of. See
supra note 15 and accompanying text. Thus, doctors would probably find such a re-
quirement to be an onerous one. In addition, although it has been suggested that blan-
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3. Implications of a TRIPS Violation
Regardless of whether section 287(c) is ever adjudged to violate
TRIPS, it raises important international policy implications.s
While there is a serious question as to whether section 287(c) vio-
lates TRIPS, even an appearance of a TRIPS violation may impact
how other member nations implement TRIPS and how they react
to the United States in future discussions regarding intellectual
property protection. The United States has always aggressively en-
ket royalty rates could be used to assure access with minimal intrusion into patient confi-
dentiality, such rates would not necessarily comply with TRIPS. A license based solely on
the number of uses may not comport with the TRIPS requirement that the license be
based on "the circumstances of each case" that take into account the "economic value of
the authorization." Sm TRIPS, supra note 28, art. 31(h).
Although this section has concluded that there is at least a viable argument that
section 287(c) is presently in violation of TRIPS, the United States is not necessarily in
immediate danger of being subject to formal action under TRIPS. So far, official disputes
under TRIPS have been raised by member states that are directly and adversely impacted
by the failure of another member state to comply with TRIPS. In each case where a na-
tion has asserted a TRIPS violation, the complaining nation's own intellectual property
rights were at stake; in particular, the complainants' intellectual property rights were
negatively affected because inadequate protection resulted in free riding and loss of reve-
nue to the complaining party. See, e.g., Request for Consultations by Canada Concerning
EC - Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticals and Agricultural Chemical Products,
WT/DS153/1 (Dec. 2, 1998) (alleging European Community's ("EC") failure to comply
with TRIPS article 27(1), on basis that EC regulations discriminate with respect to subject
matter because they only apply to pharmaceuticals and agricultural products); Request
for Consultations by EC Concerning Canada - Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical
Products, WT/DS114/1 (Dec. 19, 1997) (alleging Canada's failure to provide adequate
protection to pharmaceuticals in violation of TRIPS articles 27(1), 28, and 33); Request
for Consultations by United States Concerning Portugal - Patent Protection Under the
Industrial Property Act, Wr/DS37/1 (Apr. 30, 1996) (alleging Portugal's failure to pro-
vide adequate term of patent protection in violation of TRIPS articles 33, 65 and 70);
Request for Consultations by United States Concerning Pakistan - Patent Protection for
Pharmaceuticals and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS36/1 (Apr. 30,1996) (alleg-
ing Pakistan's failure to provide adequate patent protection or mailbox rights for phar-
maceuticals in violation of TRIPS articles 27, 65 and 70). The section 287(c) violation
does not fit the same mold. Because TRIPS explicitly allows medical procedures to be
excluded from patentability and most other nations deny such patentability, there may be
no adverse impact on other states. Thus, other member states may lack the motivation to
raise a formal challenge despite the existence of technical noncompliance. See, e.g.,
Portnan, supra note 29, at 119 (noting that countries who already ban patents on medical
and surgical procedures are unlikely to complain about TRIPS violation regarding this
subject matter). Se general/y Reichman, supra note 308, at 347 (suggesting that WTO
"should insist on a showing of material injury to the complainant state as a prerequisite to
intervention at the international level" in context of suggestion for some doctrine of
ripeness for WTO disputes). This may suggest that TRIPS is an inadequate mechanism
for enforcing international norms of intellectual property protection. However, a discus-
sion of whether such norms should be enforced through a means that is less tied to trade
impacts is beyond the scope of this Article.
HeinOnline  -- 33 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 671 1999-2000
Unwmily of Cahfomia, Davis [Vol. 33:601
forced its intellectual property rights;H further, the United States
has taken an aggressive posture in both negotiating and enforcing
the TRIPS agreement2 m Other nations may be less likely to uphold
the TRIPS provisions if they perceive that the United States, a ma-
jor proponent of the TRIPS agreement, ignores its provisions.m
Accordingly, former PTO Commissioner Bruce Lehman noted that
section 287(c) "is troubling on the international front" because it
makes it more difficult to require other countries to fully imple-
ment the TRIPS agreement32
Moreover, an actual or perceived TRIPS violation might under-
mine any future United States arguments for stronger intellectual
property protection. For example, the United States may lose bar-
gaining power in future TRIPS discussions concerning the scope of
patentability. In particular, it may put the United States in a poor
negotiating position with respect to TRIPS article 27(3) (b), which
currently allows countries to preclude patentability of genetically
' For example, the United States has used various trade acts to negotiate intellectual
property trade disputes. See, e.g., 2 THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY
(1986-1992), at 2255-59 (Terrence P. Stewart ed., 1993) (describing United States's use of
section 301 of 1984 Trade Act prior to initiation of Uruguay Round to improve intellec-
tual property protection outside of United States); C. O'Neal Taylor, The Limits of Eco-
nomic Power: Section 301 and the World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement System, 30 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 209, 225-42 (1997); see alsoJames Mcllroy, American Enforcement oflntellec-
tual Property Rights: A Canadian Perspective, 1 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 445, 445-57 (1998)
(providing overview of approaches that United States has used to unilaterally enforce its
intellectual property rights).
s' Beginning with the Tokyo Round of GATT the United States began introducing
the idea of intellectual property rights into the GATE regime. At that time, the idea was
limited to counterfeited trademarks and their adverse impact on trade. See Agreement on
Measures to Discover the Import of Counterfeit Goods, GATT Doc. L/4817 (July 31, 1979). The
United States initially stood alone in its desire to link trade with intellectual property. See
HUGO PAEMEN & ALEXANDRA BENSCH, FROM THE GATE TO THE WTO: THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY IN THE URUGUAY ROUND 84-85 (1995) (noting that United States was initially
alone in desiring all intellectual property to be included in Uruguay Round). The United
States continued to persist and eventually succeeded in putting intellectual property on
the Uruguay Round agenda. See, e.g., GERVAIS, supra note 268, at 10-28; Michael L. Do-
ane, TRIPS and International Intellectual Property Protection in an Age of Advancing Technology,
9 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POLY 465,466-76 (1994).
m See 142 CONG. REC. Si 1,844 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (letter from Jennifer Hill-
man, General Counsel of USTR, to Sen. Hatch); see also id. at SI 1,846 (statement ofJohn
Kirk, chair of ABA) (cautioning against enacting legislation that would send dangerous
precedent to other countries with respect to weakening patent protection); id. (letter
from AIPLA) (noting that enacting section 287 would "clearly be inimical to the interests
of American industry for the United States to take the lead in weakening the patent pro-
tection required under Articles 28 and 30 of the TRIPS").
' See Hearings on S. 507 Before the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary
, 
105th Cong., lstss Reg.
Sess. (1997) (statement of Bruce Lehman, PTO Commissioner) (responding to question
from Chairman Hatch about § 287(c)).
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modified plants and animals.s" Although the United States wants
broader subject matter patentability," ' it consented to article 27(3)
as part of enacting TRIPS as a package deal.m This provision hurts
the United States because it is narrower than the United States
patentability standard and thus fails to protect American inventors
abroad.m In addition, the language in article 27(3) can lead to
unpredictable patentability of plants and animals, which is similarly
troubling." 4 Indeed, language similar to TRIPS article 27(3) has
resulted in inconsistent case law concerning whether genetically
modified plants are patentable.m Although the United States ul-
timately wants to eliminate the article 27(3) exemption, its position
may now be undermined by its perceived failure to comply with
TRIPS.
336
'* See TRIPS, supra note 28, art. 27(3)(b).
See, e.g., United States Draft Agreement, supra note 97, at 428 (proposing article 23
that states that *patents shall be granted for all products and processes which are new,
useful, and nonobvious" without any subject matter restrictions); GATT, Intellectual Prop-
erty Provisions Hearings on H.R 4894 Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Propeny and Judicial
Administration of the House Comm. on the Judiy and S. 2368 Before the Subcomm. on Patents,
Cofyrights, and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 403 (1994)
(statement of biotechnology company Genentech regarding biotechnology industry's
desire for broad definition of patentable subject matter); International Chamber of
Commerce, Policy Statement: The Review of TRIPS article 27.3 <http://www. ic-
cubo.org/Commissions/Intellectual-property/Review-ofTRIPS.htm> (on file with au-
thor) (noting that article 27(3) (b) arose out of fierce controversy over clause).
'" See, e.g., David G. Scalise & David Nugent, InternationalIntellectual Propery Protections
for Living Matter. Biotechnology, Multinational Conventions and the ExceptionforAgriculture, 27
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 83, 114 (1995). In addition, the United States would like this
provision to be deleted. See WTO Implementation Report: Trade-Related Intellectual
Property Rights, Mar. 11, 1996 <http://www.ustr.gov/reports/wto/intellectual
_property.html> (on file with author).
' Piracy is a particular problem for the biotechnology industry because typically
substantial expenditures are required for development, but replication is inexpensive.
See, e.g., Elizabeth Henderson, TRIPS and the Third World: the Example of Pharmaceutical
Patents in India, 11 EuR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 651, 659-60 (1997); see also Sudhir D. Ahuja,
IP Treaties Show Little Effect in India, IP WORLDWIDE, Jan.-Feb. 1999, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Current file (noting this problem of piracy in India). Although United
States patents can compensate for an initial investment of capital, the compensation is not
complete if the invention can be easily duplicated abroad.
"' See, e.g., Harvard/Onco-mouse, 1991 Eur. Pat. Off. Rep. 525 (Examining Div.),
1990 Eur. Pat. Off. Rep. 501 (EPO Tech. Bd. App.), rev k 1990 Eur. Pat. Off. Rep. 4 (Ex-
amining Div.).
', See, e.g., Robin Nott, The Novartis Case in the EPO, 21 EUR. INTELL PROP. REV. 33
(1999); Ingeborg Voelker, Europe Won't Reverse Controversial EPO Ruling, IP WORLDWIDE,
July-Aug. 1997 <http://www.ljx.com/patents/7-8europe.html> (on file with author).
' United States negotiating power in the context of TRIPS may also be undermined
by a recent enactment to United States copyright laws. In fact, a formal complaint against
the United States has already been raised by the EC regarding United States amendments
to the Copyright Act that allow public places to play music without payment of royalties;
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CONCLUSION
Congress should repeal section 287(c) because the statute not
only fails to accomplish the main objective of the medical commu-
nity in eliminating the specter of litigation against doctors, but also
has negative ramifications for domestic and international policies.
Until section 287(c) is repealed, the ability of the United States
patent system to promote innovation will continue to be compro-
mised. Moreover, the immunity provision leaves the United States
vulnerable to international criticism and diminishes its ability to
raise the level of intellectual property protection worldwide.
At a minimum, section 287(c) should be revised to comply with
TRIPS and to foster innovation in accordance with patent law and
policy. Even if compulsory licensing of medical procedure patents
is to be maintained, the present system that automatically licenses
all of these patents without compensation violates article 31 of
TRIPS. A more nuanced system that considers the individual na-
ture of each medical procedure patent is necessary to comply with
TRIPS and to fulfill the patent system's policy of promoting inno-
vation.
The repeal or revision of section 287(c) is only a necessary first
step in resolving the tension between the medical and patent sys-
tems. As previously noted, section 287(c) does not entirely address
the issues of conflict between the two systems; personal liability for
doctors continues to exist under section 287(c), and the principles
of sharing and access to health care that section 287(c) was in-
tended to preserve are still compromised. While repeal is war-
ranted, it would merely return the parties and policies to their
prior positions.
The conflict between the medical and patent policies must
therefore be revisited and addressed in conjunction with similar
conflicts. While this Article argues that patents can be reconciled
with medical policies just as patents were reconciled with the
norms of the scientific community, reconciling policies would not
entirely eliminate conflict. In particular, although the scientific
community has adjusted to the concept of patents, the use and
this has been contended to be in violation of TRIPS art. 9(1). See Request for Consulta-
tions by EC Concerning the United States - Section 110(5) of U.S. Copyright Act,
Wr/DS160/1/IP/D/16 (Jan. 26, 1999). Regardless of whether the United States is even-
tually found adjudged to violate either provision of TRIPS, both situations undermine the
United States claim to strong intellectual protection.
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enforcement of patents has not been without criticism. In addi-
tion, recent developments in the area of patenting biotechnology
have raised renewed objections to patents that mirror those of the
medical community - harm to the sharing norm and restricted
access to medical procedures.
These similar conflicts should be addressed together because
piecemeal discussion will likely result in disparate treatment of dif-
ferent technologies by the patent system. Accordingly, to truly re-
solve the tension between patent and medical policies, the underly-
ing conflicts must be addressed along side similar issues raised in
other technological fields. Hopefully, next time patent policies
intersect with other social policies, such a comprehensive approach
will lay the groundwork for a complete consideration of all relevant
interests and thereby serve the interest of all parties.
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